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EINLEITUNG
Die Lage der empirischen Sozialforschung ist durch die Herausbil­
dung unterschiedlicher "Lager" gekennzeichnet, die mehr durch die 
Bemühung um eine Abgrenzung nach außen gekennzeichnet sind als den 
Versuch, Vorzüge und Nachteile einzelner Verfahrensweisen jeweils 
spezifisch auf eine konkrete Forschungsfrage hin zu evaluieren. Diese 
globale Feststellung gilt sowohl für die U.S.A. als auch die Bundes­
republik - auch wenn die Fronten im einzelnen anders abgesteckt 
sind. In den U.S.A. ist eine zunehmende Verengung des Begriffs 
"Methodologie" auf komplexe statistische Auswertungsverfahren (ins­
besondere Strukturgleichungsmodelle) zu konstatieren. Dies dokumen­
tiert sich sowohl in den "Methodologie"-Sitzungen auf den amerika­
nischen Soziologentagen wie in den offiziellen Jahrbüchern "Socio- 
logical Methodology" der American Sociological Association. Diese 
statistischen Verfahren setzen naturgemäß standardisierte, quanti­
tative Daten voraus, die vorzugsweise mit dem Instrument der Umfrage 
erhoben werden. Die einst dominierende "Chicago"-Schule der dreis- 
siger Jahre mit ihren stärker auf Beobachtung und Feldinterview 
abhebenden Techniken ist in eine Randposition gedrängt, ebenso wie 
andere "qualitative" Ansätze, wie etwa die Ethnomethodologie. Daß 
mit William F. Whyte ("Street Corner Society") und Erving Goffman 
nun nacheinander zwei prominente Vertreter der "anderen Richtung" 
zu Präsidenten der ASA gewählt wurden, zeugt vielleicht von einem 
gewissen Unbehagen an der dominierenden quantitativ-statistischen 
Richtung, ändert aber nichts an der prinzipiellen Rollen- und Macht­
verteilung.
In der Bundesrepublik ist das Unbehagen und die teilweise durchaus 
berechtigte Kritik an der Umfrageforschung - als Prototyp der 
"mainstream,,-Sozialforschung - schon früh auf fruchtbaren Boden ge­
fallen; genährt von einer traditionell eher sozialphilosophischen 
Orientierung ("Frankfurter Schule") und den im Zuge der Studenten­
bewegung formulierten politischen Ansprüchen. Wo die empirische So­
zialforschung nicht gänzlich abgeschrieben wurde, war zumindest das
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Bemühen dominant, sich von einem sogenannten "normativen Paradigma" 
abzugrenzen und sich einem "interpretativen Paradigma" zu subsumie­
ren. Diese von Thomas P. Wilson in der American Sociological Review 
im Jahre 1970 vorgeschlagene begriffliche Trennung wurde - und 
wird - vielfältig gleichgesetzt mit der Verwendung bzw. Nichtver­
wendung bestimmter Techniken und Verfahrensweisen (etwa quantifi­
zierende Repräsentativumfragen vs. Tiefeninterviews in Einzelfall- 
studien). Wilson ging es jedoch in dieser Unterscheidung nicht um 
eine solche Dichotomie von Techniken als vielmehr um das prinzipiel­
le Verhältnis von Forscher und Daten. Einen ähnlichen Gesichts­
punkt hat Jürgen Kriz in seinem vor kurzem erschienenen Buch über 
"Methodenkritik empirischer Sozialforschung" - bezogen auf quanti­
tativ orientierte Untersuchungen - ausführlich dargelegt.
Mangels einer Tradition von Feldforschungen ethnographischen/kultur­
anthropologischen Typs in Deutschland ist ein großer Teil "alterna­
tiver" Sozialforschung in der Bundesrepublik durch eine bloße Aus­
weitung der Datenerhebung (nicht-standardisierte Interviews, Grup­
pendiskussionen etc.) gekennzeichnet, ohne eine ausreichend klar 
formulierte und vor allem durchführbare Gesamtkonzeption, in der 
auch die Auswertungsprobleme gelöst werden. Es gibt sicher interes­
sante Ansätze, wie etwa die Methode des narrativen Interviews 
(Fritz Schütze) oder die "objektive Hermeneutik" (Ulrich Oevermann), 
die jedoch vor allem unter pragmatischen Durchführungsaspekten noch 
weiterer Ausarbeitung bedürfen und nicht repräsentativ für die 
"alternativ" verfahrenden Forschungen sind.
Als Motiv der Abkehr von traditionellen Forschungstechniken kann 
vielfach der Wunsch nach einer "lebensweltlichen Anreicherung sozio­
logischer Forschung" gesehen werden (vgl. hierzu auch jüngst Martin 
Kohlis Bestandsaufnahme des "biographischen Ansatzes" in der Zeit­
schrift für Soziologie). Dieses Anliegen ist ernstzunehmen, unab­
hängig vom politischen Standort und gesellschaftlichen Weltbild des 
Forschers. Das Unbehagen, die Unzufriedenheit auch vieler potentiel­
ler Abnehmer soziologischer Forschung nährt sich nicht zuletzt aus
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der Tatsache, daß die Sozialforschung zu oft nur ex post-Erklärun- 
gen für gesellschaftliche Prozesse (etwa die Studentenbewegung) zu 
liefern in der Lage war, nicht aber Veränderungen im status nas- 
cendi aufzuspüren vermag. Oder anders formuliert: Die Sozialfor­
schung hat ihr Ohr zu oft nicht am Puls des Volkes.
Auf diesem Hintergrund ist der ZUMA-Workshop mit einem zweifachen 
Ziel konzipiert worden:
auf der Ebene allgemeiner Methodologie sollten Kriterien der 
wissenschaftlichen Güte spezifisch für bestimmte Verfahrens­
weisen definiert und diskutiert, der Aspekt der gegenseitigen 
Ergänzung von "quantitativen" und "qualitativen" Techniken 
herausgearbeitet werden;
- auf der Ebene praktischer Methoden der Ansatz (ethnographischer) 
Feldforschung amerikanischer Tradition und dafür besonders 
nützlicher Einzeltechniken dargestellt werden; schwerpunktmäßig 
anhand von konkreten Beispielen aus der Forschungspraxis.
Die Auswahl der Hauptreferenten orientierte sich an dieser Ziel­
setzung. Mit Thomas P. Wilson (University of California, Santa 
Barbara) konnte der Vater des Begriffs "interpretatives Paradigma", 
der in der Bundesrepublik durch die deutschsprachige Fassung seines 
oben erwähnten Aufsatzes im Reader der "Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder 
Soziologen" weite Verbreitung gefunden hat, gewonnen werden. Aus­
gewiesen durch eine Reihe quantitativ-statistischer Arbeiten hat 
Wilson in den letzten Jahren verstärkt über die wissenschaftstheo­
retische Begründung "interpretativ" orientierter Sozialforschung 
und insbesondere das Verhältnis von Soziologie zur Ethnomethodolo- 
gie gearbeitet. Seine Zielvorstellungen hat er in der Formel einer 
"ethnomethodologisch informierten Sozialwissenschaft" zusammenge­
faßt.
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Don H . Zimmerman (ebenfalls von der University of California,
Santa Barbara) ist zwar von seiner Forschungsorientierung her als 
Ethnomethodologe im engeren Sinne zu klassifizieren, hat aber die 
Strategie der Abkapselung - die viele Vertreter dieser Richtung 
auszeichnet - nie geteilt und in Aufsätzen wie konkreten Forschungs­
projekten eine fruchtbare Verbindung zur traditionellen Sozial­
forschung hergestellt.
Ein Großteil des Programms der Arbeitstagung wurde von den beiden 
Referenten aus den U.S.A., Thomas P. Wilson und Don H. Zimmerman, 
bestritten, die zur Vor- und Nachbereitung des Workshops einige 
Wochen als Gäste bei ZUMA weilten. Kurze Beschreibungen gegenwär­
tiger Arbeitsschwerpunkte und -interessen, die jeder Teilnehmer vor­
ab zur Verfügung stellte, dienten sowohl zur Kommunikationsförde- 
rung unter den deutschen Teilnehmern als auch dazu, es den Haupt­
referenten zu ermöglichen, die Präsentation ihrer Arbeiten auf den 
Hintergrund der deutschen Gesprächspartner abzustellen.
Neben den beiden den thematischen Bereich absteckenden Positions­
papieren "On Qualitative 'versus' Quantitative Methods in Social 
Research" und "Field Work as a Qualitative Method" fand insbesonde­
re eine ausführliche Präsentation von Don H. Zimmerman zum Thema 
"Analysis of Talk in Field Settings" großes Interesse. Grundlage 
dieses Vortrags sind jüngste Arbeiten Zimmermans im Rahmen eines 
größeren - schwerpunktmäßig relativ konventionell verfahrenden - 
Forschungsprojekts über "Gewalt in der Familie"; ein Thema, das - 
nicht zuletzt gefördert durch die Frauenbewegung - zumindest in den 
U.S.A. breiteres öffentliches Interesse gefunden hat. Zimmerman 
widmet sich hier dem Teilproblem, wie die Polizei - als Instanz 
sozialer Kontrolle - entsprechende Telefonanrufe (Notrufe) behan­
delt und damit "Gewalt in der Familie" als öffentliches Problem 
mitkonstituiert oder auch zu konstituieren verhindert. Die Analyse 
derartiger, thematisch spezieller Telefonkonversationen erfordert 
als Vergleichsbasis die Analyse von Anrufen bei der Polizei gene­
rell, und noch einen Schritt weiter gedacht die Beschäftigung mit
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Kommunikation via Telefon allgemein. Dies verdeutlicht die Brücke, 
die sich zwischen vermeintlich nur esoterisch-versponnener Konver­
sationsanalyse ethnomethodologischer Prägung und der Untersuchung 
handfester sozialer Probleme spannt.
Die Präsentationen der Hauptreferenten wurden ergänzt durch die 
Vorstellung verschiedener Projekte der deutschen Teilnehmer. Brei­
teren Raum nahm hier vor allem ein von Elmar Weingarten (FU Berlin) 
geleitetes Projekt über Intensivstationen im Krankenhaus ein, das 
von seinem Forschungsdesign her (ausgedehnte Feldbeobachtungen und 
-interviews durch das Forschungsteam selbst) der von Wilson und 
Zimmerman vertretenen Konzeption sehr nahe kommt und von daher be­
sonders gute Möglichkeiten zu vergleichender Diskussion bot. Weitere 
Projekte stellten u.a. Manfred Auwärter/Edit Kirsch (Starnberg), 
Ulrike Martiny (Hamburg), Werner Nothdurft (Institut für Deutsche 
Sprache), Charles Kaplan (Universität Frankfurt und Institute for 
the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia) sowie Friedrich Schrecker 
(Wiesbaden) vor.
Einen größeren Platz nahm - als immer wiederkehrendes Thema - die 
Diskussion von angemessenen Kriterien wissenschaftlicher Güte ein. 
Die traditionellen Kriterien wie Repräsentativität, Validität und 
Reliabilität sind für Forschungen, die stärker auf die Feinanalyse 
von Prozessen ausgerichtet sind als auf die notwendig gröbere Be­
stimmung von Gesamtverteilungen, nicht oder zumindest nur modifi­
ziert verwendbar. Zu dieser Problematik hat Wilson in seinem Po­
sitionspapier ausführlicher Stellung genommen und alternative Vor­
schläge unterbreitet.
In diesem ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht sind die beiden oben erwähnten Posi­
tionspapiere abgedruckt, die damit allgemein zugänglich gemacht 
werden. Während das Papier von Don H. Zimmerman gegenüber der auf 
der Arbeitstagung verteilten Fassung nur geringfügig modifiziert 
wurde, ist die nun abgedruckte Version des Wilsonschen Papiers eine 
geschlossene Darstellung der Argumentationen, die Wilson in ver­
schiedenen Sitzungen der Arbeitstagung vorgetragen hat.
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Die recht ausführlichen Literaturangaben in beiden Papieren er­
möglichen eine gezielte Auseinandersetzung mit den hier vorgetra­
genen Sichtweisen auch für Interessenten, die an der Arbeitstagung 
nicht teilnehmen konnten.
FIELDWORK AS A QUALITATIVE METHOD
Qualitative social research, and in particular, participant 
observation, is an established tradition of research in American 
social science, the ascendancy of quantitative analysis as the 
"scientific" mode of inquiry within the profession notwith­
standing. The tradition has produced its classics, major and 
minor, and graduate students are usually held responsible for 
having read them. Survey courses of research methods mention 
field techniques, at least in passing, and the "methodology," of 
fieldwork is subject to periodic attempts at codification, emerg­
ing as textbooks or manuals of qualitative research.
Despite the fact that qualitative research is in some sense 
an "established" mode of inquiry, and even though it seems pos­
sible to recognize good exemplars of the tradition, there remains 
an air of informed vagueness concerning just what techniques or 
strategies to recommend to those colleagues brave enough to 
venture into some setting, notebook or taperecorder at the ready. 
Practical lore exists, to be sure, and the literature can be made 
to yield both the detailed memoirs of past fieldwork and attempts 
to develop recipes for research in this mode. Many of these 
accounts are useful in that they sensitize the would-be field- 
worker to a range of practical issues-— access to the setting, 
rapport with informants, note-taking, etc.— but the features of 
social settings differ sufficiently such that the actual manage­
ment of these problems awaits experience in the setting itself. 
Thus, it is appropriate to critically examine the aims and prac­
tices of qualitative research, particularly those lines of in­
quiry addressed to what 'Jilson (1931) has termed "situated action," 
that is,
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...actions in particular concrete settings as these 
actions are produced and are available to the par­
ticipants for their own recognition, accounting, and 
use as bases for further inference and action within 
those settings.
In this paper, I ccaisider how such a conception of the nature of the
subject matter bears upon the practice of qualitative research
and how, following upon this, canons of "good work." might be
developed so that this research tradition could be subject to
more explicit critical appraisal by its practitioners. I
1
proceed by first critically examining Herbert Blumer's "natur­
alistic inquiry" which furnishes a conception of the subject 
matter of sociological study and proposes what is a fundamentally 
qualitative approach to it. After considering a number of cri­
ticisms of Blumer's "naturalistic inquiry," I introduce a brief 
characterization of an ethnomethodological perspective on the 
subject matter of inquiry and use this to develop one view of 
the issues of qualitative research and the criteria by which it 
may be evaluated.
The Syiubolic Interactionist Framework of 
Blumer's "Naturalistic Inquiry"
Blumer proposes three simple but central premises upon which 
symbolic interactionism rests: (1) persons respond to objects 
and events in terms of their meaning; (2) meaning emerges from 
social interaction; and (3) meaning is managed and transformed 
through an interpretative process (1969:2). The "interpretive 
process" presumably figures in the construction of individual 
or collective social acts (cf. Blumer, 1969:50ff.). The method­
ological implications of these premises are fairly straightforward.
First, given the notion that people act on the basis of the 
meaning objects in their environment have for them, it follows 
that sociologists are constrained to understand these objects as 
members understand them. Thus, "failure to see their objects as 
they see them, or a substitution of (the sociologist's) meanings 
of the objects for their meanings, is the gravest kind of error 
that social scientists can commit" (Blumer, 1 969 :51 ). To achieve
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this understanding requires the researcher to acquire famili­
arity with the world of the member. This means, among other 
things, placing "oneself in the position of the individual or 
collectivity" in question, and to assemble a body of relevant 
observations... in the form of descriptive accounts from the 
actors of how they see the objects, how they have acted towards 
the objects in a variety of different situations, and how they 
refer to their objects in their conversations with members of 
their own groups" (Blumer, 1969:51). The suggestion is quite 
plain: our subjects can tell us what various objects mean to 
them— reliance on informants is a common enough research strategy 
— and we can overhear conversations between members in which the
various objects that populate their symbolic environments are
2
discussed in terms that we can record and report. As field- 
workers, moreover, we can observe and report both our subjects' 
and our own behavior in a setting, as well as our introspected 
internal states (cf. Denzin, 1971:168,180), deriving from these 
records additional materials for fashioning our account of the 
meaning of objects and events from the point of view of the 
member.
"Naturalistic Methodology11: Some Objections
Blumer's "naturalistic methodology" has not escaped criti­
cism. Recently, McPhail and Rexroat (1979) have chastized 
Blumer for what they argue to be fundamental departures of 
Blumer's symholic interactionism from Mead's social psychology. 
The central issue of their critique is not the suspect creden­
tials for Blumer's claim to the Meadian tradition
but the poor showing of his "naturalistic 
methodology" in comparison to Mead's scientific rectitude. They 
locate Blumer's difficulties in his naturalistic ontology, that 
is, his assumption that the social world in all its varieties is 
already ordered by the people who make their home within it. In 
contrast to Mead's position that "science is not concerned with 
the nature of reality; rather science is concerned with 'order­
ing the events it observes' (Mead, 19 36:275)" (McPhail and 
Rexroat, 1379:457), Blumer calls upon the investigator to search
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out the order already present, and to hold concept and theory 
formation accountable to that order (Blumer, 1969:23-24). In 
discussing the ontological basis of Mead's conception of sci­
entific procedure, McPhail and Rexroat propose that:
Mead's (1936:275) ontological perspective dismisses any 
concern with the 'nature' of observed events, Rather, 
the investigator is required to provide directions which 
will occasion the convergent responses which order ob­
served events. Blumer’s ontological perspective, if 
anything, requires the opposite. He directs investi­
gators (1969:39,45) not to assign but to discover the 
nature of their concepts. They are directed not to im­
pose relationships upon their analytic components but to 
discover them through intense scrutiny of the empirical 
world...The consistent respect in which Blumer holds 
'the nature of the empirical world' and his lack of at­
tention to investigators’ convergent responses and the 
interactions and the interactions which produce them, 
give us the ontological assumptions upon which his natur­
alistic methodology is constructed (1979:458-459),
They go on to suggest that Blumer's conception of an indi­
genous order to social life poses a paradox within the framework 
of symbolic interactionism. If, they argue, "human actors im­
pose meaning and order upon their own and others' activities," 
how can Blumer consistently apply this premise to the social 
world under investigation and simultaneously deny that the ac­
tivity of research--a human activity presumably a part of the 
same social reality— imposes meaning and order on its subject 
matter? (McPhail and Rexroat, 1979:459), Their own view is ex­
pressed by their formulation of the notion of "domains of meaning," 
by which they indicate that social life as understood by parti­
cipants can differ from the understanding of the same arena of 
activities achieved by researchers. "Neither domain," they write, 
"is any more natural or less artificial than the other. One or 
the other, or both, may be more useful depending on the purposes 
at hand" (McPhail and Rexroat, 1979:4 62-463).
Clearly McPhail and Rexroat mean to imply that the inves­
tigator should exercise complete analytic authority over the 
field of data, that is, impose a conceptual framework con­
strained only by its utility in achieving "convergent responses" 
from other professionals, This option is often elected by
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sociologists. If, however, as they concede, human actors con­
struct a "domain of meaning" of their own, then they must de­
velop "convergent responses which...establish shared meaning, 
common understanding, and socially constructed lawfulness,.." 
(McPhail and Rexroat, 1979:463), This surely implies that it 
is possible to talk about a "natural" order to be discovered in 
social activities, and it would be odd, to say the least, if 
such an orderliness was not available to systematic study,
McPhail and Rexroat, then, have succeeded only in raising 
serious question concerning Blumer's claim to be following in 
Mead's footsteps— an uninteresting issue from my point of view 
— rather than delivering a death blow to Blumer's "naturalistic 
methodology." Their quarrel with Blumer's insistence on re­
specting the point of view of the actor may, if we may speculate, 
be rooted in the suspicion that this brand of "naturalism" leads 
to mirroring social reality rather than to its analysis.
This concern is echoed, although in different form, by 
Huber (197 3:280) who notes with reservation Blumer's insistence 
on "faithful reportorial depiction and analytic probing (and 
his demand that the investigator remain) in close and continu­
ous relation with the natural social world." Assuming that in a 
given study the sociologist has faithfully reported what infor­
mants have divulged about their soical world, one can wonder, 
as does Huber (1973:280) in a slightly different context, how 
"to distinguish the findings of sociologists from the findings 
of anyone else" and be concerned with how the practitioners of 
this approach could avoid having their reports,,,confused with 
mere journalism" (Huber, 1973:282). Leaving aside the relatively 
conventional objections to Blumer's (1969:28-31) wholesale re­
jection of accepted research procedure, e.g., hypothesis testing, 
operational definition, etc,, the concerns just examined do re­
quire attention. If the "natural social world" is to be faith­
fully reported, to what sociological purpose are such reports 
to be put beyond the painstaking description of social reality?
A satisfactory answer to that question will also provide a means 
for distinguishing a "naturalistic" study from journalism or an 
aimless empiricism. To approach an answer to this question, a 
number of issues must be raised and briefly discussed.
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Issues in Seeking the "Point of View 
of the Member"
First, the notion of placing "oneself in the position of 
the individual or collectivity" (Blumer, 1969:51) requires 
elucidation, particularly with respect to its implication for 
research strategy. This I shall attempt when I discuss a field 
procedure called "tracking" (Zimmerman and Wieder, in press).
Second, short of a thoroughgoing behaviorism (cf. Wilson 
and Zimmerman, 1979/30), grasping "the point of view of
the member" and thus obtaining an intimate view of a partciular 
social world, requires sharing (or coming to share) a common 
language and, beyond that, being instructed in that language 
on the matter of how to respond to and talk about the various 
activities or events that make up that world in a situationally 
sensitive, and hence appropriate, way. These resources will be 
employed by the observer to fashion a description of what was 
seen or heard in the setting. Descriptions furnished by infor­
mants may be called "natural language accounts" of social ac­
tivities.^ What is problematic is that such accounts are indi­
genous to the setting they depict, and reflexive upon it (cf. 
Garfinkel, 1967; Wilson and Zimmerman, 197 9/80:57-60).^ The 
upshot of this is that the embeddedness of talk in and of the 
setting of its occurrence may mean that the matters thus de­
scribed from the point of view of the member may not be fully 
understood by the researcher, or worse, may be misunderstood.
Thus, in Zimmerman and Wieder's (1978) study of marijuana 
smoking (which will be considered in more detail later), seem­
ingly contradictory informants' accounts of marijuana use turned 
out, under further scrutiny, to be consistent and warranted 
depictions of socially organized smoking practices in that youth 
sub-culture. Capturing the "point of view of the member" is 
not simply a matter of listening to what they say or asking them 
to explictly state the meaning of things. It involves locating 
members' accounts within the organized ways of a setting, a r e f l e x ­
ive process itself since the account furnishes the initial 
instruction for the search while the search subsequently informs 
the sense of the initial instruction. Moreover, pursuit of the
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member's point of view is not merely chasing after disembodied 
meanings but rather the tracking down of collectively accomplished 
patterns of social organization, a point which leads directly 
to a third issue.
Concern with the member's viewpoint is often understood to 
be a "subjective" approach. The term "member," however, we con­
strue in the ethnomethodological sense, that is, as referring to 
membership in a collectivity with its attendant rights and obli­
gations (Garfinkel, 1967) as well as the possession of compe­
tency in society's ways, including the mastery of natural language 
practices (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). This does not deny the 
individual's subjectivity, i.e., the experiences of the inner and 
outer world gained from the vantage point of a singular life, but 
emphasizes intersubjectivity, the activities and accounts pro­
duced by the member for members. Clearly, the field worker inter­
acts with individuals, and questions them concerning their 
thoughts, feelings and opinions. Nevertheless, one of the fore­
most uses of the ethnographic interview is to elicit socially 
sanctioned knowledge from an informant, i.e., descriptions, ex­
planations and evaluations that would be recognizable to and 
socially supported by other competent members of the setting as 
correct and/or appropriate, and thus sanctionable. Private opin­
ions or deviant viewpoints may be of interest, but concern for 
understanding the structure and social process of a setting must, 
in the first instance, lead to a focus on accounts which could 
meet the test of collective, i.e. intersubjective, validation.^ 
The point I wish to stress is that it is necessary to assess the 
status of an informant's remarks lest field work become merely 
a passive reflection of members' undisciplined musings about 
their own affairs. Respect for the "point of view of the member" 
should not entail the transfer of analytic authority to the sub­
jects of our research.
Fourth, and finally, what guidelines might be established 
to discipline the organization and analysis of ethnographic data 
collected while respecting the constraints of "naturalistic in­
quiry"? That is, is it possible to specify criteria in terms of 
which data of this sort may be sifted, arranged, and made to tell 
a sociologically interesting story without forcing an arbitrary
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conceptual framework upon it? Vie shall consider responses to 
each of these issues in turn.
The Problem of Positioning®
To speak of placing oneself in the "position of the indi­
vidual or collectivity" would seem to require a translation of 
what is, in the first place, a spatial metaphor, into a prac­
tical plan for marshalling opportunities to observe and question 
research subjects. To begin with, of course, a basis for the 
investigator's presence in the setting must be established, i.e., 
some acceptable rationale for the intrusion of the observer 
into the social space of the target group must be devised. Tor 
example, Whyte, in his study Street Corner Society (1943/1981), solved 
this problem through establishing a relationship with Doc, a 
leader of a group of "Corner Boys." There are other solutions 
to the entrance problem, depending on the nature of the setting9
in question and the strategy of observation adopted. While 
the problem of entry can sometimes perplex the would-be observer, 
a more serious problem looms when entry has been successfully 
effected.
This problem may be termed the "positioning" problem, the 
"getting into the thick of it." Even relatively simple social 
settings exhibit a diversity of behavior patterns distributed in 
time and space and across different categories of persons. Solu­
tions to the problem of positioning the observer in such a way 
as to accommodate this diversity will inevitably have conse­
quences for the nature and scope of information that can be 
gained, given that the observer cannot be everywhere at once 
nor can he expect to achieve the same degree of rapport with all 
potential subjects. The ideal, never reached in practice, is 
that of the omniscient, omnipresent observer, free to travel in 
space and time, invisible to those observed, and possessed of 
the ability to read minds. Short of
such talents, the ethnographer must devise means to get to where 
he needs to be, see and hear what he can, develop trust between 
himself and his subjects, and ask a lot of questions.
One way of accommodating this diversity of behavior in set­
tings may be formulated as a general ethnographic strategy we call
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tracking. Prior to discussing tracking in any detail, we
need to take a closer look at the problem of the diversity of 
behavior in settings with which tracking, as a method of "posi­
tioning" the observer, can deal. Some of the most fundamental 
dimensions of this diversity may be illustrated by considering 
the problem of observing an American university.
(1) Holes and other person-related differences. The ob­
server must come to terms with the fact that different 
people and different types of people do different 
activities and that they also behave, feel, and think 
in tyically different ways. These differences are 
often organized into different roles or social cate­
gories, e.g., age, sex, race, etc. The observer 
generally decides to focus on some specified roles 
rather than observing everyone he happens to confront 
on a "catch-as-catch-can" basis. In observing the 
university, the observer would be likely to select 
some roles from the wide range of roles {from deans
to students to gardeners) which are potentially 
available to him.
(2) Diversity within roles. The extent to which the ethno­
grapher must concern himself with differences in behav­
ior, feeling, and thought among incumbents of the same 
role depends heavily on exactly how he circumscribes 
his subject matter. For example, if he defines his 
problem in terms of the role of the student in the 
university organization as such, the fact that students 
differ in many ways may not be relevant to his study.
It may be sufficient for the ethnographer to set out
to observe all the different ways that students can act 
on campus as students (what the range of possible be­
havior is while enacting the student role) and what they 
must do as students (what they must minimally do if they 
are to maintain their status as students as compared 
with what they could do to get themselves dismissed 
from the university), Other definitions of the topic 
of interest, however, will require that the ethnographer 
be more deliberate in his sampling of the persons whose 
behavior and talk he observes, perhaps even requiring 
a representative sample. An interest in the variety of 
student life styles, for example, is likely to require 
such a sample.
(3) Temporal diversity. The ethnographer must also concern 
himself with the fact that behavior, feeling, and thought 
Vary temporally in terms of (1) daily, weekly, seasonal, 
etc., cycles, (2) in terms of phases of activity, and
(.3) more or less idiosyncratically. The university, for 
example, presents a very different scene for observa­
tion at twelve midnight as compared to twelve noon.
The first day of classes looks different from classes
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in midterm. The behavior of one student who engaged 
in the practice of "cramming” might involve his not 
studying during most of the semester. Observation 
might also show that when he did study prior to exam­
inations, the way in which he behaved changed progres­
sively as the hour of the examination approached.
That is, one could observe that his pre-examination 
behavior had definite phases to it. Furthermore, the 
temporal arrangement of some of his behavior might 
appear idiosyncratic. The same student might appear 
outgoing and happy during some weeks of the semester 
and withdrawn and depressed during other weeks, with­
out these mood shifts being associated with other 
temporally organized features of his existence. Never­
theless, his behavior, especially vis-a-vis other 
students, might be markedly different during these 
periods. If the ethnographer observed only one of 
these periods, his observations would be skewed. Some­
how, the ethnographer needs to take into account the 
cyclical character of the observational scene, the 
differences between various phases of activities that 
may go on within that scene, and the possibility of 
idiosyncratic temporal differences,
(4) Spatial or locational diversity. Persons may behave, 
feel, and think in typically different ways, depending 
on the setting or sub-setting in which they locate or 
find themselves. On the same university campus, one 
may find a more-or-less standardized way that students 
act and even feel and think with-in classrooms which 
contrasts with the typical ways that they behave, feel, 
and think in the gymnasium, at a rock concert, in the 
student union, in the library, and in professors' offices. 
The ethnographer must position himself relative to these 
various sub-settings and know the relationships between 
them if he is to make sense of what he observes.
(5) Interactional diversity. How persons behave, feel, and 
think may systematically vary depending on whom they are 
interacting with and who is present. For example, stu­
dents may talk in one fashion when they are in a dis­
cussion group that is led by a faculty member and in 
another fashion when they are together in the student 
union without faculty present. The ethnographer must 
either position himself in such a way as to permit him 
to observe these interactional differences or he must, 
at least, be aware that there are systematic forms of 
behavior that he is unable to observe.
In keeping with the tenets of "naturalistic observation," 
the investigator must of course be concerned to glean from such 
observations the meaning of events and activities to partici­
pants. Obviously one resource for this is available in talk 
people do. The observer may find that the scenes of interest 
are organized in such a way that the participants are constantly
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commenting on the meaning of their activities. For example, 
in some universities, one may find that "what classroom activi­
ties are all about" from the point of view of students is the 
principal topic of discussion between students in the student 
union. An observer who sits with students in the student union 
might hear all that he needs to know. On other campuses, how­
ever , students' conversations in the student union might be 
largely devoted to talk of weekend and nighttime activities as 
well as the playing of bridge. An ethnographer of such a campus 
might have to form relationships with students which permitted 
him to interrogate them about the meaning of classroom activities. 
We should also note that the ethnographer who found students 
freely talking about the classroom might also decide that addi­
tional and private interrogation was also necessary for him, 
since the way students talk in public about lectures, faculty, 
and the like might be a partial view of what these things mean
4 - U  10to them.
The ethnographer, then, is faced with the task of (1) en­
countering and describing the repetitive events and activities 
that make up the routines of the group he is studying. He will 
attempt to position {and systematically reposition) himself in 
such a way as to take into account role and other person-related 
differences, temporal and spatial differences, and interactional 
differences. He also has the task of (2) positioning himself 
socially so as to obtain information about the meaning of these 
activities from the point of view of those who engage in them.
That isf he must either be in a position to overhear and be a 
participant in naturally occurring conversations in which the 
meaning of routine events is discussed by the participants and/or 
form relationships with the participants which permit him to 
freely interrogate them.
I suggest, then, that to pursue an adequate investigation 
of social conduct in situ requires making observations on behav­
iors presumed to be distributed across roles, varying within 
roles across incumbents as well as through time and by location, 
and varying in response to the interactional combinations of 
roles and/or persons in the given setting. In effect, these 
dimensions represent five basic sources of variation in conduct,
- 12 -
at least in the sense that the observer should look to determine 
whether or not some activity is uniform or variable over such 
features.
It should be clear that in offering these dimensions of 
diversity we obviously assume that a given setting exhibits some 
degree of social organization, and that members' words and deeds, 
and the meanings infused in them, stand in some orderly relation­
ship to that organization, e.g., accomplishing or reproducing 
its features. Moreover, attention to such dimensions of vari­
ation requires information about the setting which the investi­
gation itself is expected to generate, creating a "bootstrap" 
situation. This situation provides one insight into the diffi­
culty of fully rationalizing a research design prior to acquir­
ing actual experience in the field setting.
Tracking
The features of social life outlined above pose a challenge 
to the ethnographer who proposes to describe some particular 
social scene. We view tracking as one response to this challenge. 
We did not, of course, invent this strategy, for many of the 
features of tracking outlined below are to be found in the work 
of a number of participant observers (e.g., Bittner, 1 967a,b;
Black and Reiss, 1970; Piliavin and Briar, 1964; Skolnick, 1967; 
Sudnow, 1967; and Zimmerman, 1969).
Tracking, first of all, provides a way for the ethnographer 
to overcome the sometimes frantic urge to be everywhere at once, 
while at the same time allowing him to approach this goal. This 
is done by systematically following the routine of a succession 
of different role-incumbents over some time period. By peri­
odically switching from one subject to another, the observer is 
eventually able to encounter many of the patterned activities 
within the setting from a number of different role-bound 
perspectives.
In tracking, the ethnographer stays as close to his subject 
as he can manage, attempting to see what the subject sees as well 
as noting what he does and what he says. Skolnick (1967:33) pro­
vides an example of tracking police:
- 13 -
I spent eight nights with...patrolmen, mostly on week­
ends, on the shift running from 7 pm to 3 am. All of 
this time was spent interviewing and observing, talking 
about the life of policemen and the work of the police­
man. I understood my job was to gain some insight and 
understanding of the way the policeman views the world.
I found that the most informative method was not to ask 
predetermined questions, but rather to question actions 
the policeman has just taken or failed to take, about 
events or objects just encountered, such as certain 
categories of people or places of the city.
Skolnick then shifted his attention to the vice control 
squad. While he does not describe much of the actual sequences 
of his observations there, what he does describe gives us an 
impression of the observer's closeness to his subjects in "track­
ing" work (1967:35-36):
Under direct observation, detectives were cooperative.
They soon gave permission to listen in to telephone 
calls, allowed me to join in conversations with infor­
mants, and to observe interrogations. In addition, they 
called me at home when an important development in a 
case was anticipated. Whenever they went out on a raid,
I was a detective as far as any outsider could see...I 
looked enough like a policeman when among a group of 
detectives in a raid for suspects to take me for a de­
tective ... Even though I posed as a detective, however,
I never carried a gun...As a matter of achieving rapport 
with the police, I felt that such participation was re­
quired. Since I was not interested in getting standard 
answers to standard questions, I needed to be on the 
scene to observe their behavior and attitudes expressed 
on actual assignments.
Tracking provides a systematic solution to the problem of
positioning the observer vis-a-vis the diversity of behavior
11in settings. As is evident in the examples above, tracking 
in the hands of Skolnick and others provides a way of position­
ing the ethnographer so that he may observe not only what people 
do and thus be able to infer or develop evidence concerning what 
these matters mean to the participants. Furthermore, by sys­
tematically tracking the occupants of one role (e.g., a sergeant 
in the police department) and then tracking another (e.g., a 
lieutenant in the same division), etc., the ethnographer is 
able to incorporate into his research plan and description the
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the fact that persons in different roles act differently. If 
his definition of his research problem demands it, the ethno­
grapher may, if he chooses, track a number (even a representa­
tive sample) of incumbents of the same role. By tracking the 
same individual over a sufficient period of time, he is able 
to take temporal variation into account. Because he follows 
one individual over the full course of that individual's day, 
he is also able to observe the differences in the individual's 
behavior which are related to (or caused by) the various set­
tings in which he acts and the various persons with whom he 
interacts -
Tracking, of course, .is a strategy based on the overt ob­
server role. It presupposes the ability of the investigator to 
move across social boundaries in a given setting with some de­
gree of freedom and the ability to ask questions and engage in 
conversation with a wide range of participants. Unless the so­
cial setting and its activities are tightly encapsulated and 
delimited in time and space, such as the "tea room" setting in 
which anonymous, impersonal sexual activity is performed largely 
in silence (cf. Humphreys, 1970), occupying a pre-existing role 
in some setting constrains the covert observer to the range of 
behaviors appropriate to that role, and what Merton (1957:368-70) 
calls role set.
The discussion of tracking above obviously does not pro­
vide a precise algorithm for research design. It is, however, 
intended to provide guidelines for developing a systematic plan 
of observation given a reasonably clear picture of a setting's 
organization. This picture may not begin to emerge until after 
entry into the field, or it may be partially revealed by pre­
liminary inquiry, e.g., interviews with knowledgable people,
1 2analysis of documents, etc.
Use of the notion of tracking, in that it encourages a 
systematic attempt to encounter a range of persons and situ­
ations , provides a means to discover the array of local identi­
ties in the setting, and to become informed of the relevancies 
that are tied to particular scenes. Insofar as such relevancies 
and identities are embedded in routine activity, they may be 
difficult to elicit from disembodied interviewing. The
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ethnographic interview--asking questions on the actual occasion 
of some activity or event the meaning or purpose of which is 
unclear to the investigator--is an essential element of the op­
timal use of tracking as a field procedure.
To conclude this section on the issue of "positioning," we 
should point out that this view of observational strategy is 
constrained by a conception of social life as methodically 
accomplished by members. Among the features of this accom­
plishment are the "social fact" properties of everyday life: 
the repetitive, routine, standardized, transpersonal and trans- 
situational character of patterns of social activity from the 
point of view of the member. Thus, it may diverge from the 
symbolic interactionist conception of social reality, such as 
that advocated by Blumer, from which premises this discussion 
began. The central premises of symbolic interactionism affirm 
again and again the human capacity to delicately shade meaning, 
to take into account many varied aspects of objects, fashioned 
from even the most routine and standardized social occasion.
This celebration of these human skills is the platform from 
which critics, such as Gonos (1977 :856ff .), attack. He is espe­
cially critical of the symbolic interactionist emphasis on situ­
ations, He writes:
Symbolic interactionists have considered it their the­
oretical calling to describe the rich texture of every­
day social life, a quality highly valued by them and, 
allegedly, totally ignored in the functionalist por­
trayal of social reality, against which they define 
their movement.To remain true to human experience, 
they have insisted on study at close range, as parti­
cipants, and, from this vantage point, the situations 
that make up everyday life have been seen as idiosyn­
cratic, , .The reward for research activity would seem 
to be an endless wonderment (1977:856) ,
However, if we are to speak meaningfully of a member-of- 
society's "construction" of a situation, or more loosely of 
the "construction of the social world", it must be kept firmly 
in mind that if indeed the situation is "constructed," it is 
constructed methodically, using common cultural resources which 
permit not only the production but the recognition of such
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construction. Detailed understanding of members’ methods for 
the production and recognition of social objects, events, and 
activities, while an important goal in its own right, also 
serves to impose a discipline of analysts of social activity 
who would speak on behalf of the point of view of the member. 
Only by knowing how members construct their activities can one 
be reasonably certain just what those activities are. An ap­
proach to the investigation of how members "construct" their 
activities will be discussed later in connection with an exam­
ination of the analysis of talk as an ethnographic procedure.
Grasping "The Point of View of the Member"
Earlier, it was suggested that grasping "the point of view 
of the member" might pose problems, even when "explained" by 
the member to the researcher. An example from an ethnographic 
study of marijuana smoking practices was used to illustrate
this point. It will be useful here to examine th.is example in
,  13 more detail.
An example: marijuana smoking 
A useful illustration of the points we have been making 
is provided hy the study by Zimmerman and Wieder Cl 978) in a 
student community. Because of space limitations, we cannot 
discuss this study in detail here but must assume that the reader 
is familiar with the paper itself,
Zimmerman and Wieder conclude their analysis with the fol­
lowing general remark.
It should be clear by now that we proceeded by em­
ploying our informants' remarks--in the context of what 
we already understood about the community we were study­
ing— as guides to further inquiry, instructions, as it 
were, for assembling disparate observations into a co­
herent pattern of activity. In turn, the emergence of 
pattern further deepened our grasp of how our informants' 
commentaries articulated with social arrangements in the 
setting. Thus what we heard from the people we studied 
was both resource and topic and yielded a picture of 
social organization sustained by our independent inves­
tigation but consonant with, our subjects' accounts of 
its consequences. Our informants were not simply sur­
rogate ethnographers furnishing disinterested descriptions 
of their activities, but neither were they dupes fooled by
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collective prejudices into thinking their activities were 
of one sort when they "really" were of quite another.
The problem was to discover in what way to regard what 
was said.
In the final analysis, the talk that goes on in and 
about social settings cannot be regarded as distinct from 
the setting, as something that can be detached and exam­
ined at leisure apart from the lively context of its oc­
currence. The contours of socially organised settings 
(and the internal structure of the organization itself) 
often require an instructed gaze provided by indigenous 
accounts; but it is the working of that social organ­
ization which invests the accounts with specific sense.
Thus, "grasping the point of view of the member" poses a 
challenging analytic task that goes beyond mere reportage. It 
requires careful observation, the integration of varied sources 
of information, an appreciation of the intimate tie between 
setting and account, and a willingness to exercise a ''socio­
logical imagination," that is, to reserve to the investigator 
the analytic authority to transcend the viewpoint of the subject 
while nevertheless employing it as the basic datum.
The Issue of "Subjectivism"
The preceding section has in passing addressed the issue 
of subjectivism and the related concern that naturalistic in­
quiry (or observational research more generally) is prone to 
stick too closely to informants' or subjects' reports and employ 
them in an uncritical fashion. This concern is founded on the 
notion that social reality is hidden from the individual, or at 
best only partially available; and that the individual’s ac­
counts are distorted, subject as they are to prejudice, ignor­
ance, special interest, and a common-sense outlook. The 
systematic, objective approach of (usually quantitative) social 
science is thus mandatory, while close intercourse with subjects' 
mere accounts constitutes one or another brand of subjectivism. 
This view— and i acknowledge that it is drawn perhaps too 
starkly here— in turn rests upon a view of the member as essen­
tially passive, as acted upon by social forces rather than being 
an active participant in their creation. Consistent with this 
outlook is the correlative tendency to view subjects' remarks as
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prepositional in character, and thus literal. This ignores the 
tie between account and setting developed in the marijuana study. 
It thus seems appropriate at this junction to introduce a some­
what truncated characterization of the ethnomethodological stance
1 4that informs my conception of qualitative research.
Jeff Coulter (1979:20-25) has recently provided a formu­
lation of ethnomethodology that is directly concerned with the 
problem of subjectivity, ( In drawing upon his work to illumin­
ate the issues, we construe his concepts and terminology within 
the context of the approach to ethnomethodology 
found in Wilson and Zimmerman 1979/19CO' ). Coulter pro­
poses that the aim of ethnomethodology is "to work out analyses 
of the reasoning structures and conventional member-orientations 
involved in various empirically observed courses of social in­
teraction" (p. 21), The "reasoning structures" to which Coulter 
refers centrally involve the exercise of common-sense knowledge. 
One can understand common-sense knowledge either in the sense of 
"knowing that"'— common-sense knowledge as comprised of differen­
tially distributed, situated and often inconsistent if not dubi­
ous propositions about the social world— or in the sense of 
"knowing how. " It is this latter view of common sense that is 
crucial. Coulter writes:
The aspects of what can be called 1commonsense1 which 
interest the ethnomethodologist are those which enable 
anyone possessing it to perform their ordinary activities 
in ways that are recognizably appropriate, rational, in­
telligible, proper, correct or reasonable for all prac­
tical purposes...commonsense amounts to a set of culturally- 
furnished abilities. Such abilities constitute the doing 
of any mundane activities, such as transmitting informa­
tion in various contexts, recommending something to some­
one, persuading someone about something, enumerating, 
grading, complaining, insulting, warning, apologizing, 
thanking, promising, ascribing statuses, and countless 
other practical actions,..To say of someone that he is 
able to do such things means that he knows how to do them, 
and this practical knowledge forms the central core of 
what is here being descripted as "commonsense knowledge 
of social structure" (1979:21-22, emphasis in original).
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What one knows how to do, in short, is to methodically 
produce, in concert with others, the varied events and scenes 
of everyday life. And, what is important here, the orderliness 
of everyday settings is available to us as observers for the 
same reason that is is available for the "use and appreciation” 
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1973:29 ) of members, i,e,, by the sys­
tematic assembly and recognition of social activities made 
possible by the practices of common-sense reasoning. An im­
portant component of this achievement is found in the intimate 
"tie between (commonsense reasoning) and mastery of natural 
language" (Coulter, 1979:21-22; cf. Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970: 
341-45). As Coulter notes:
..,an overwhelming number of our ordinary, everyday 
activities are performed in and through speaking, and 
most of the rest presuppose linguistic abilities. The 
commonsense competence in which the ethnomethodologist 
has an interest, then, is in large measure co-extensive 
with natural-language competence; the one varies with 
the other insofar as they are mutually constituted. Vie 
learn a language and a common culture and pari passu , 
and we discover, through speaking with others, where, 
and to what extent, that common culture of a natural 
language fragments and where it is sustained between us 
(1979:22).
Thus, the ethnomethodological concern to analyze practical 
reasoning and the exercise of common-sense knowledge also in­
volves the study of natural language practices. The ethno- 
methodologically inspired but distinctive tradition of work 
known as "conversation analysis" has opened this particular 
subject matter to sociological inspection and has already 
recorded significant advances in our understanding of the struct 
ture of conversational interaction.
Some further remarks on natural language pertinent to the 
topic of our concern are necessary here. The study of natural 
language involves the investigation of the systematics of pro­
ducing utterances, sequences of utterances, and other expres­
sions both verbal and non-verbal which can in turn provide the 
framework within which it can be ascertained (a) how these
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conversational "gestures" achieve a particular meaning or de­
lineated range of alternative meanings in some local environ­
ment; (b) how they contribute to, establish, negotiate or 
expose a “definition or definitions of the situation"; or 
(c) express and warrant assertions or statements concerning 
one's or the other's "state of mind," "motive," "feeling," and 
so on. These activities are seen as situated accomplishments 
of the use of "natural language" and are of interest as they 
can lead to a fuller understanding of how the system that pro­
duced them works. Ethnomethodology, then, is not concerned with 
interior goings-on of the acting subject, nor is it occupied 
with rendering a description of the particular meanings attri­
buted to situations by participants' analyses. The concern is 
instead: insofar as members recognize and respond to such ob­
jects as "state of mind" or "motive" or "the meaning of a situ­
ation," then the ethnomethodologist takes it that such objects 
are methodically produced and appreciated by members, an achiev- 
ment itself in need of description and analysis in its own right. 
Moreover, as Coulter has put it:
Nothing in (ethnomethodology1s) program commits us to a view 
of human conduct as beyond the categories of the public, 
social world; reasoning structures are cultural and the 
abstract categories of ethnomethodology consist in cate­
gories alien to psychologism. There are no 'egos', no 
irreducible 'impulses', no 'subjective meanings', no 'in­
terior states', no individualizing ontology and no interest 
in 'the private domain', whatever that could mean. There 
is no uncontrolled intuiting, even though the exercise of 
commonsense, reasoned intuition forms a necessary first- 
order step toward getting analysis off the ground (1979:
24; emphasis in the original).
To summarize, the term "methodology" in the compound word 
"ethnomethodology" points to a commitment to understand the 
member-of-society1s collective use of systematic procedures to 
assemble and assess social activities and events. The use of 
these procedures is itself an activity, not a conception or an 
idea in someone's head or anyone's head. If any social activi­
ties are publicly observable, the activities that comprise the 
exercise of common-sense reasoning and natural language compe­
tencies are publicly observable.
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As x hope is evident, I am employing a concep­
tion of ethnomethodology to generate what is termed an ethno- 
methodologically informed sociology" (cf. Wilson and Zimmerman, 
1979/80), that is, to attempt the application of ethnomethodo- 
logical insights and findings, including those of conversation 
analysis, to the more conventional concerns and topics of soci­
ology, i take Bittner’s (1967arb) studies of police practice; 
Emerson and Pollner's (1976) research on psychiatric emergency 
teams, Zimmerman and West's (1975) study of male dominance in 
conversation, Maynard and Wilson's (1980) inquiry into the re­
production of bureaucratized judicial settings, and Maynard's 
(1979) research on the conversational basis of "plea-bargaining" 
as examples of such an ethiiomethodologically informed sociology. 
We also engage in the application of the ethnomethodological 
framework to the development of appropriate research strategies 
for the collection and analysis of empirical observation. This 
leads me to the final issue to be considered in the critical 
appraisal of field work; guidelines for the anaysis of obser­
vational material, e.g., field notes and ethnographic interviews.
Working Criteria16
Ethnographic procedures yield a large amount of detailed 
and heterogeneous information. It is the investigator's task 
to transform this fund of data into a defensible representation 
of the social phenomena of interest. In simpler terms, th.e in­
vestigator attempts to take a large amount of detailed informa­
tion and make it into a "factual" and general story. The 
pertinent question here is how this can be done and justified 
on grounds other than tfie researcher's intuition, based on famil­
iarity with these details. While many ethnographic reports are 
formulated in terms of the researcher's general familiarity with 
the data, analyses of ethnographic materials can be subjected to 
realtiyely specific constraints which make the analysis more 
methodical and rigorous.
The problem facing the ethnographer is essentially this; 
such social phenomena, e.g., socially organized patterns of 
behavior, etc., have the character that no single observation
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(without the context of other observations) is, in itself, 
clearly identifiable as an observation of the phenomenon of 
interest. For example, the normative character of a norm 
partially resides in its repeated use. A pattern of behavior 
emerges as a pattern only through repeated observation. And, 
for example, the idea of personality or character structure as 
used in clinical psychology and in the field of culture and 
personality "refers to some observable consistency in behavior. 
An unrepeated type of action is not in itself made the basis 
for establishing a dimension of type of personality..." (Turner, 
1961:58). As we shall see, repetitivity is only one of many 
possible constraints upon the researcher which demand some par­
ticular organization for his observations.
The form that the phenomena of interest should have— as those 
phenomena are conceptualized within some discipline such as 
sociolgy— can be "translated" into guides or instructions for 
the researcher's observations, analyses, and theorizing. While 
guides or constraints should be derivable from any fundamental 
social scientific conception of some phenomena, we will illus­
trate these matters with the fundamental conceptions of social 
organization and culture which define a very general stratum of 
sociological phenomena. The proper use of these two concepts, 
in effect, informs the investigator's sense of what he is look­
ing for and looking at. How these conceptions can operate as 
constraints on, or guides to, observation and theorizing can be 
seen by considering each of them in turn.
Social Organization
"Social organization" refers to regularities in conduct 
(alternatively, stable patterns of social interactions) which 
are systematically interrelated. The concept is rather broad 
and is defined in different ways according to the particular 
perspective adopted by the investigator. In general, the notion 
is used to talk about a specifiable population of actors who are 
linked together through a network of social relationships and 
who engage in interdependent activities of a distinctive char­
acter within a bounded social territory. Under the auspices of
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this notion, ethnographers attend to such particulars as the 
scheduling and sequencing of activities, the use of titles and 
other forms of address, the ways in which interactions are ini­
tiated and terminated, which actors can request or demand what 
of whom, and so forth (see Garfinkel, 1956), Such details con­
stitute the basis of talking about more global patterns of con­
duct and their interrelationships.
What must an investigator observe if he is to claim that 
he has detected some form of social organization conceived of 
in this fashion? How can he use this basic sociological con­
ception in the actual practice of his observational work? How 
can he claim to have detected particular patterns of organiza­
tion in the reported performances and associated commentaries 
of subjects? The criteria we suggest are derived from explicit 
and implicit statements of classical sociological theory. 
Durkheim's (1962) conception of social fact provides for many 
of these criteria, but they are not unique to his work (cf.
Wieder, 1974:31-37; Wilson and Zimmerman,1979/1980).
Description: To begin with, any analysis requires that 
the phenomenon of interest be circumscribed and defined in some 
fashion. Sociologically interesting phenomena may arise from 
theory or from the researcher's empirical acquaintance with his 
subject matter. In either case, some statement of the phenomena, 
couched in the "language of observables," must be made, In sur­
vey research, such statements tend to be operational definitions. 
In ethnographies of all forms, the phenomena may be circumscribed 
by the ethnographer's attempt to describe some typical social 
form and then testing that described social form against further 
data.
How ethnographic or qualitative data such as interviews 
might be used to develop evidence that a particular pattern of 
social organisation has a typical form may be illustrated by 
some materials drawn from the marijuana smoking study discussed 
earlier, I illustrate this and other criteria with the practice 
of marijuana smoking as a unit of social organization, i , e ,,, the 
use of marijuana as a socially constrained activity requiring a 
particular kind of interaction between participants (Zimmerman 
and Wieder, 1971:42-72), It should be noted that this particular
- 24 -
practice is offered as an example, not in the expectation that 
it is news, but by virtue of its simplicity. Through the use 
of diaries (Zimmerman and wieaer,1977 ),
as well as other information (including limited first-hand ob­
servation) , a description was obtained of one phase of mariiuana 
use, the practice of "passing the joint" (when more than one 
person is involved).
Having arrived at a description of a unit of interest, it 
was possible to inspect diaries for references to "smoking oc­
casions," note the features recorded by the diarist, question 
the diarist further in the interview, and compare this informa­
tion with that available from the diaries of other informants 
or field notes based on direct observation.
The process of searching the materials for instances of 
the practice thus defined affords the opportunity to confront 
the occurrence of the practice in a different form. The object 
of the search is to provide the ground for asserting that the 
practice, when it occurs, typically occurs in the way specified.
Recurrence; The search for reported instances of the phe­
nomenon of interest in order to gain confidence in its descrip­
tion is inseparably linked to the process of accumulating 
evidence that the phenomenon recurs as described. For example, 
it is well known that marijuana smoking is a widespread activity 
among college-age youth such as those who served as subjects in 
our research. The point, however, is that we wished to make the 
claim (trivial though it may appear when viewed in isolation 
from other aspects of marijuana use) that the practice or social 
form not only recurs, but that it recurs in a standardized 
fashion.
DistributionV The criterion of recurrence is also tied 
to the issue of distribution and cannot be fully explicated with­
out reference to it. The phenomenon must be examined with 
respect to its distribution relative to the types of situations 
and types of actors making up the interaction setting of the 
group in question. Thus, the search of our material focused on 
the types of occasions in which the practice of "passing the 
joint" occurred and the composition of the participants. Our 
conclusions were not surprising: the matter was reported by
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virtually every diarist; it was widely distributed with respect 
to different types of social occasions wherein it was possible 
to smoke without detection or effective action by authorities; 
and it was almost universally engaged in by the individuals in 
question.
Transpersonality; The matters of recurrence and distri­
bution lead us to another criterion: the independence of the 
practice or social form from the personalities of the individu­
als involved. In our research, the issue here was whether or 
not "passing the joint" was a custom that was passed on to each 
succeeding cohort of persons adopting the life style, since this 
was central to the determination that the pattern under scrutiny 
was a feature of the social organization of the community rather 
than a feature attributable to the makeup of the individuals in 
the community. Also involved here is the notion of relative 
persistence, i.e., distinguishing between a transitory phenome­
non (a "fad" or "fashion") and something more enduring. The ob­
servation that persons are socialized to a pattern is one kind 
of evidence for its transpersonality.
Diary materials and other data, to no one's amazement, 
indicated that "passing the joint" was indeed transpersonal in 
the sense specified above. Just as persons are taught to ex­
perience the effect of marijuana as pleasurable (Becker, 1953), 
they are also taught— largely by example--to "pass the joint," 
and in addition may acquire certain common rationalizations for 
the practice, e.g., "it is more economical" or "it's a way of 
increasing a solidarity," etc. I might add that this practice 
is by no means unique to the community studied and that others 
besides counter-culture youth also "pass the joint."
Culture
Culture is conventionally conceived as a more-or-less inte­
grated system of norms and values which define the desirable 
ends of action and the appropriate means of achieving them. 
Sometimes referred to as "designs for living," culture is one 
basis for the actor's definition of the situation. The relation­
ship between culture and social organization is of critical
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interest in ethnographies. Social organization, within this 
scheme, is the result of norms and values being systematically 
translated into conduct: the fundamental patterns of social 
organization are culturally sanctioned. One consequence of 
this proposal is that the ethnographer must construct a descrip­
tion of "basic" social organizational patterns that is congruent 
with the actor’s view of social reality. Since the notion casts 
the actor in the role of sanctioner or cultural agent at least 
some of the time, it must be supposed that instances of the pat­
tern in question are recognizable to him as an instance of the 
way things should (or should not) be done.
There are, of course, some systematic patterns of action 
which are indirectly related to norms and values and are, in and 
of themselves, not specifically culturally sanctioned. That is, 
it is possible to formulate patterns of behavior that are re­
current, distributed, and transpersonal which are not in any 
direct sense culturally constrained although they may be derived 
from more fundamental patterns which are, e.g., differential 
crime rates, rates of residential mobility, motor vehicle acci­
dents, etc.
From this general sociological perspective there is, then, 
the additional criterion for developing an empirically warranted 
description of social phenomena which goes hand in hand with the 
criteria for describing social organization: the researcher must 
find evidence that the behaviors constituting the pattern of 
social organization are sanctioned and enforced within the group 
in question. In alternative language, the task is to show that 
such patterns constrain the conduct of the individual, either 
through internalized dispositions to comply, or institutional­
ized expectations of compliance enforced by sanctions (Wilson, 
1970). I should also point out that since the relationship 
between culture and social organization appears to be causal, 
the reader may wonder why we treat cultural features as criteria 
for an empirically warranted description of social phenomena.
In brief, the causal connections between cultural elements, e.g., 
norms, and the patterns of behavior making up social organization 
is illusory. Partially formulated cultural elements frame the 
observations the ethnographer makes of patterns of behavior.
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Similarly, partially formulated, observed patterns of behavior 
lead the ethnographer to see that certain utterances of his 
informants are statements of and about their culture. Culture 
and social organization are thus aspects of the same phenomenon. 
(Cf. Wieder, 1974; Wieder and Zimmerman, 1976).
In the example of "passing the joint," one could well raise 
the question whether the form in which it so regularly occurs is, 
in fact, culturally sanctioned, i.e., whether deviations are 
noticed and corrective action applied. No clear-cut instances 
of deviation were apparent in our materials, so we were required 
to employ hypothetical examples in certain diary interviews to 
explore this dimension as well as to examine closely those cases 
where certain participants refrained from smoking. While I 
cannot go into detail on our findings in this respect, our anal­
ysis suggested that (.1) failure to pass a joint, should it occur, 
would be sanctioned; (2) persons are expected to share a joint in this 
fashion if they are going to smoke at all; and (3) the ritual 
takes precedence over other concerns, e.g., the communication of 
disease (Zimmerman and Wieder, 1971:52-55).
Procedurally, the determination that a pattern is cultur­
ally supported rests on (1) encountering reported instances of 
sanctioning (e.g., a negative remark such, as, "He's really on a 
power trip," or reports that a particular person is being avoided 
or is subject ot derogatory comments by virtue of (a) a particu­
lar act or series of acts or (b) the view that he is the kind of 
person who will persist in certain undesirable behaviors; and
(2) incidents in which persons are being explicitly instructed 
to behave in a certain way.
In concluding this section, I should point out that the 
patterns or regularities reported by a particular ethnographer 
(or, for that matter, any investigator, regardless of the method 
employed) are always more-or-less recurrent, distributed, etc.
The quantitative or qualitative specification of these proper­
ties is always relative to the sophistication of the available 
observational and measurement procedures and the feasibility of 
their use in the particular study, as well as the level of pre­
cision required by the problem under investigation. For most 
purposes, the properties obtained as indicative of stable patterns
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of culturally sanctioned social organization can serve as a 
set of guideposts for directing and evaluating ethnographic de­
scriptions of social phenomena, whatever the scope of obser­
vation or level of measurement.
Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed some issues in qualitative 
methodology in connection with field research on systems of 
situated actions in natural settings. I have attempted to deal 
with two general kinds of issues. One set of questions con­
cerns quite practical matters of technique. The other concerns 
issues in the basic logic of inquiry. The point of contact be­
tween these two levels is the problem of the researcher attempt­
ing to develop an empirically grounded and theoretically cogent 
analysis of a segment of social reality. The central theme 
around which the discussion has revolved is that the phenomena 
of social life are produced by the activities of members of 
society as they pursue the routine and not-so-routine activities 
of everyday life, while at the same time these activities are 
available to members as understandable and coherent only within 
their social organizational context. Thus, from the point of 
view of both technique and logic of inquiryr the researcher is 
compelled to discover how social life is systematically organ­
ized for the members themselves, not so much in the subjective 
sense but rather as a matter of intersubjective reality for 
rendering their interactions with one another coherent and in­
telligible, It is on this basis that my specific recommenda­
tions and general reflections are put forward.
NOTES
1. I have chosen to discuss Blumer's perspective because, 
first of all, his conception of the subject matter of sociolog­
ical inquiry is, at one level, similar to ours. He has, more­
over, been a consistent advocate of our approach to inquiry 
which, if not in principle qualitative, has in practice been
so very often. The perspective taken by Glaser and Strauss, 
and by Norman Denzin, are related and similar.
2. In a similar vein, Denzin tells us that the practi­
tioner of naturalistic inquiry
respects and takes seriously those he studies.
Indeed, he cultivates close realtionships. Hop­
ing to be taken seriously by the subject, he 
recognizes that alert, observant participants 
know more than he ever will about the realities 
under investigation (see Blumer, 1969: 41). Such 
persons serve as natural resources and checks on 
emerging theory. Acting as a panel of judges, 
they collectively and singly evaluate and help 
construct valid and viable theories of their so­
cial worlds...Native persons serve, too, as me­
thodological consultants and field guides...On 
other occasions the native can coach the observer 
on new field techniques, suggesting important 
modifications in existing research strategy 
(1971 :168-69).
3. This is not to say that the description constructed by 
the researcher is not a "natural language account." When in the 
form of a research report or article, it is an account delivered 
within a different setting, that of the practice of social sci­
ence. We cannot explore the implications of this suggestion here.
4. Wilson and Zimmerman (1979/80) write:
...The concept of reflexivity holds that context 
(here read: social setting) and particular (here 
read: a detail or details of an account, or the 
account itself) are mutually elaborative rather 
than being analytically independent terms. This 
relation of...mutual elaboration figures in the 
specific determination of meaning on a given occa­
sion, and it is the simultaneous seeing of particu­
lar and context in their reflexive relation that 
constitutes the transparency (i.e., readily evi­
dent meaning) of displays.
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5. It might well be the case that some collectively 
validated accounts of how things work are merely myths. Such 
an eventuality is one of the motives for eliciting "private," 
"personal" or "off-the-record" opinions of a setting's work­
ings, Informants may furnish an "official account" in the 
hearing of others, and a different version in confidence. The 
finding that other informants reveal similar unofficial ver­
sions in private could thus illuminate the structure of "in­
sider's" versus "outsider's" knowledge and permit a fuller 
understanding of both ideology and the organization of activity 
in th.e setting,
6. Similarly, inquiry cannot be confined to faithful wit­
ness to the member's understanding of some setting; sociologi­
cal interest requires more than a chronicle of everyday life.
7. The materials in this section (pp. 8-15) are adapted from Don H. 
Zimmerman and D. Lawrence Wieder, "The Diary— Diary Interview 
Method," in Robert B. Smith, ed,, Social Science Methods, Vol. I,
forthcoming, I would like to thank Professor 
Wieder for permitting the use of these materials. Any reference 
to this discussion should include an acknowledgment of his 
contribution,
8. Our discussion of the "positioning problem" assumes 
that the investigator has opted for the overt participant- 
observer strategy. One can, of course, distinguish between 
types of observer roles. For example, the overt participant 
observer declares himself to his subjects and openly assumes 
the role of sociologist in the midst of the ordinary social ac­
tivities characteristic of the setting he is studying. As an 
overt participant observer, he intervenes in the routine of his 
subjects. Intervention may be minimal, involving conversations 
or even formal interviews, or he may assist with or join in the 
activities of his subjects. The covert participant observer is 
something like a spy. He pretends to be something he is not—  
an ordinary participant— and operates with an ulterior motive, 
namely, to report on the activities he observes. In some in­
stances the masquerade is limited and involves the exploitation 
of very standardized conventional roles, e.g., bar patron (Cavan, 
1966), A little further down the line is a type of infiltration,
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e.g., Humphrey's (1970) assumption of the role of "watchqueen" 
in his study of sex in public restrooms. At the extreme is 
the manufacture of a biography, status characteristics and even 
physical appearance to gain access to attitudes and actions 
otherwise difficult to observe. There is a unique and contro­
versial study by a research team working for the U.S. Air Force 
in which an Air Force officer was converted into a basic trainee 
to study the morale of recruits (Coser, et al,, 1959; Sullivan, 
et al., 1958; cf, also Erikson, 1967). The overt non-participant 
observer is, obviouslyr known to his subjects as a research sci­
entist, but remains in the background and does not interact with 
subjects. It is difficult to locate a clear instance of this 
type outside the laboratory setting. The covert non-participant 
observer mode is exemplified by research done by Sudnow (1972) 
in which surreptitious photographs of individuals are employed 
as data for the analysis of "glance behavior," For this line 
of research, it is neither necessary or even desirable for the 
observer to declare himself or participate. In part, this is 
due to the nature of the social activities of interest which are 
assumed at the outset to be highly standardized behaviors which 
are frequent and common and which can be found in most public 
places where the observer has access as a member of the public. 
For more detailed treatments of various classifications of the 
observer role, see, for example, Denzin (1970:185^218); Junker 
(1960:35-40); Lofland (19 72:93-116); and Schatzman and Stauss 
(1973:52-56) ,
9. An obvious expectation of the ethnographer is that the 
setting he enters is organized in definite ways
(Humphreys, 1970:24-26), From the outset, the 
would-be observer is anticipating the constraints imposed by 
the cultural and social organization of the group he has chosen 
to study, The ways these constraints operate pose the problem 
of initial access to the setting, which can be quite varied,
For example, formal organizations are available as a research 
site contingent upon the approval of those in authority, and it 
is characteristic of such settings that there is a definite
structure of authority- In contrast, settings like bars and 
public restrooms are different kinds of possible research tar­
gets and are characterized by different internal organizations. 
Cavan (19 66) exploited the fact that there are readily avail­
able roles which she, as an adult, could easily assume, and 
thus her access problem was trivial. She also discovered that 
certain bars were largely patronized by men, and her sex thereby 
became a liability. She was also constrained in her observa­
tion by the limits of normal bar-patron conduct. Humphreys' 
(1970) investigation of sexual activity in public restrooms 
capitalized on the fact that these behaviors were also organ­
ized into definite role reltionships, among them the role of 
"watchqueen" or lookout who, by fulfilling the necessary func­
tion of warning those engaged in sex of the approach of "out­
siders" could also observe what was going on in the restroom. 
Humphreys, by assuming this role, provided for his covert soci- 
olqgica.l purpose, observation, while at the same time avoiding 
full participation himself. Both Cavan and Humphreys opted for 
the covert participant-observer approach. Most sociological 
field studies are undertaken in the overt participant-observer 
mode, in part for ethical reasons, in part for the reason that 
the covert mode constrains the observer to the confines of the 
indigenous role he or she assumes, whereas the creation of the 
observer role within a given setting typically allows greater 
latitude of observation.
10. In line with earlier considerations, such "private" 
views should be assessed with respect to their possible charac­
ter as shared-if-covert student views (e.g,, students know that 
most of their peers dislike their classroom experiences but 
keep quiet about it) or as merely personal preferences held in 
private, etc,
11. There is another sense in which tracking may be even 
more systematic, While Skolnick permitted the relevancies of 
his ohservations--the questions that he asked himself and his 
subjects ahout what they both were observing— to emerge out of 
the apparent concerns and interests the subjects had in the de­
veloping events, e.g., first they were worried about this, then 
they were pleased about that, et., there is another, more struc­
tured form of tracking which Reiss, one of its advocates, calls
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"systematic observation of natural social phenomena" (Reiss,
1971). In this method, the observer records the observations 
he makes while tracking in a pre-structured manner. The stand­
ardized recording form instructs the observer to note certain 
predecided and, hence, standardized features of the episodes 
that he witnesses.
12. In one of my field studies (Zimmerman, 1969, 19 70a,
1970b), the general organization of the research site, a 
district office of a welfare bureaucracy, was provided by a 
training class for new welfare workers which j attended.
The design of the subsequent observational study was based on 
this information.
13. The discussion that follows is adapted from Don H.
Zimmerman and D. Lawrence Wieder, "You Can't Help But Get 
Stoned: Notes on the Social Organization of Marijuana Smoking," 
Social Problems 25: 29 8-207. We would again like to thank 
Professor Wieder for allowing us to use this material. Refer­
ence to this section should include an acknowledgment of 
Professor Wieder's contribution.
14. The discussion that follows (pp. 18-20) is adapted fron Candace 
West and Don H. Zimmerman, "Conversation Analysis," forthcoming, 
in P. Ekman and K. Scherer (eds.), Methods of Research in Non­
verbal Communication. We would like to thank Professor West
for her permission to use this material. Reference to this dis­
cussion should include acknowledgment of Professor West's 
contribution.
15. Coulter's own framework is heavily indebted to a 
Wittgensteinian approach to the philosophy of language, whereas
it is not apparent that our approach (Wilson and Zimmerman,1979/1980). 
requires such commitments. Coulter's discussion of subjectivity 
is cogent from either point of view, and so these exigetical 
questions are irrelevant here.
1 6. This section (pp. 21-28) is adapted frcm Don H. Zimmerman and
D. Lawrence Wieder, "The Diary— Diary Interview Method," in 
Robert B. Smith (ed.), Social Science Methods, Vol. I, Irvington 
Press, forthcoming. We would like to thank Professor Wieder for 
permission to use this material. Reference to this section 
should include an acknowledgment of Professor Wieder's contribution.
(n. 11)
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QUALITATIVE "VERSUS" QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH:
4*
An Essay on Theory and Method
The controversy over qualitative and quantitative methods is 
perhaps the most enduring one in social science. According to one 
extreme view, we can acquire objective knowledge of social life only 
through classifying, measuring, tabulating, and using statistical 
methods. Other procedures can contribute, if at all, only by 
suggesting ideas for hypotheses that can then be tested by rigorous 
and objective quantitative methods. Moreover, according to this view, 
talk of "qualitative methods" is pernicious since it tends to en­
courage indulgence in undisciplined subjectivism. At the other ex­
treme, according to the radical qualitative position, quantitative 
methods impose a structure and form inherently alien to the vital 
texture of social life, which can be grasped only in its complex 
detail and wholeness. Statistics might be useful to organize super­
ficial facts wanted for administrative purposes, but they cannot 
reveal anything significant about the basic nature of social life.
On this account, the notion of "quantitative methods" is at best 
mischievious, for it leads to a mindless empiricism that, in its very
claims to objectivity, is fundamentally misleading about the nature1
of social life.
The issue of the status of quantitative methods is an old one, 
and in fact it seems to be responsible for the work "sociology": 
apparently Comte coined this barbarous neologism when his earlier 
term, "social physics," was purloined by Quetelet to describe statis­
tical studies of distributions of individual behavior, an approach 
Comte regarded as totally inappropriate (Hayek, 1952:177). From a 
contemporary perspective, Comtek rejection of quantitative methods 
seems incongruent with his commitment to the natural sciences as the 
intellectual model for social science, but it is perhaps explicable 
in light of his equally strong commitment to radical methodological 
holism and failure to understand that statistical methods can deal
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with aggregate data. Be that as it may, since that time, the quan­
titative position has tended to become aligned with unquestioning 
acceptance of the natural science model, in part no doubt because 
of the wide-spread belief that the essence of the natural science 
approach is nomothetic explanation through formulation of determin­
istic or probalistic laws holding universally within their domains 
of applicability. Correspondingly, the qualitative position has 
become associated with rejection of the natural science model and 
insistence on the relativity of knowledge of a social phenomenon to 
the context of that phenomenon. This context is sometimes construed 
as the prevailing historical and cultural milieu, as in macro-histori- 
cist positions, and sometimes as the immediate concrete interaction 
situation, as in micro-historicist or situationalist approaches, but 
in either case the method is ideographic, denying the importance of 
causal generalizations and emphasizing instead the elucidation of the 
full concrete detail of the phenomenon and the meaningful relations 
of these to each other and the whole of which they are parts. Thus, 
the question of quantitative and qualitative methods has been con­
founded with polemics over "scientism" versus "historicism" and the 
contemporary tendency to identify objectivity and rational empirical 
inquiry with what are taken to be the methods of the natural sciences. 
The person who rejects the hegemony of quantitative methods seems 
thereby to be rejecting the quest for objective knowledge and champ­
ioning some form of radical historicism, and one who rejects the 
natural science model as inappropriate for the social sciences is 
seen as rejecting any use of quantitative methods whatever.
Most persons engaged in social research probably incline to a 
moderate position between the extreme quantitative and qualitative 
views in their day-to-day work, particularly when they are not 
pressed to display their scientific credentials. While perhaps 
favoring one method or another in their own research, they are pre­
pared to accept other approaches as necessary and make use of studies 
employing quite different methods in order to supplement and inter­
pret their own data. Thus, as a practical matter, social researchers
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in fact tend to take for granted the interdependence of quantitative 
and qualitative methods in the course of actual research. Neverthe­
less, the polemics issuing from the extreme positions and the un­
compromising tone in which they are expressed render dispassionate 
assessment of the real methodological issues difficult if not im­
possible. Consequently, what is probably the predominant methodolo­
gical attitude in practice lacks systematic formulation and, more 
importantly, clear foundations transcending the extreme quantitative 
and qualitative positions. The purpose of this paper is to examine 
these issues in an attempt to move beyond this increasingly sterile 
and unrealistic controversy and establish rational grounds for the 
integration of quantitative and qualitative approaches.
A Point of Departure
It is evident that one's ideas about appropriate methods are 
interconnected with one's conceptions of the nature of society and 
what one can say about social phenomena. However, for all the talk 
of sociology being an empirical science, the question of the funda­
mental nature of society tends to be addressed in abstract a priori 
terms, and issues of methodology tend to be discussed on the basis 
of philosophical assumptions about scientific method. One is reminded 
in this connection of the Methodenstreit at the turn of the century 
in Germany, in which the issues of nomothetic versus ideographic 
approaches was debated from empiricist, idealist, and neo-Kantian 
positions. More recently, in the nineteen thirties in the United 
States we find the controversy over statistical versus case studies 
informed by logical positivist and pragmatist conceptions of scien­
tific method, and in contemporary debates opposed philosophical pre­
mises are no less evident. But, it may be suggested, the interminable 
nature of the controversy results precisely from these appeals to 
philosophical doctrines. For, arguments from a particular philosophi­
cal position will be persuasive only to those who already hold the 
same philosophical commitments. Thus, resort to particular philoso­
phical principles, whether those of phenomenology, neo-positivism,
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marxism, Popper, Feyerabend, or whatever, cannot be expected to 
convince persons not sharing that philosophical persuasion. To make 
progress, then, we must approach the issues in some manner other 
than on an abstract level of first principles.
The central proposal I want to make is that the nature of 
society is a question that has some essentially empirical elements 
to it, and consequently one cannot choose a methodological position 
completely freely in accord with tastes, prejudices, philosophical 
convictions, or intellectual tradition. That is to say, methodolo­
gical positions imply assertions about the nature of society that 
are subject to empirical examination, and if some of these asser­
tions turn out to be false, the methodological positions from which 
they follow cannot be tenable. Put in a positive way, methodological 
doctrines, while unterdetermined by the facts, must nevertheless 
respect the facts. We can of course ignore empirical reality and 
adopt ideas and methodological canons at variance with the facts 
as the basis for our attempts at social science. But to the extent 
that we insist on such methodological principles at the expense 
of attending closely to the phenomena we study, our results will be 
pretentious, sterile, uninteresting, and misleading. And this is not 
an unfair characterization of social research, whether qualitative 
or quantitative, that emphasizes its methodological purity.
Situated Action
What, then, are the facts that any methodological discussion 
must respect? We begin by noting that in a concrete situation, the 
participants recognize and describe what they are doing in such a 
fashion that the action of one person can reasonably be seen as 
attending to and following upon the action of another, and that these 
accounts serve as warranted grounds for further inference and action 
not only in this situation but in subsequent ones as well (cf. Mills, 
1940, and Garfinkel, 1967). Situated actions, then, are produced in 
particular concrete situations and are available to the participants
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for their own recognition, description, and use as bases for further 
action. This characterization holds for virtually all social inter­
action, whether between four-year old preschool children, ordinary 
adults, atomic physicists setting up some apparatus, or behaviorist 
psychologists discussing the results of an operant conditioning 
experiment. In each case, the participants attend to and take serious­
ly what the others say and do.
The central point now is that for the most part the social 
sciences define their subject matter in relation to situated actions. 
Note, for example, that one is not confined to the categories used 
by the actors, for it is perfectly possible to employ second-order 
constructs that are not used by the people whose actions are being 
studied, provided these constructs are grounded in those actions.
Thus, a community may have no arrangements for tabulating crimes and 
calculating crime rates, nor indeed even any conception of a rate; 
but this does not prevent an observer from gathering the data and 
studying crime rates provided a notion of crime is institutionalized 
within the community. Here a second-order construct, "crime rate", 
is unknown to the members of the community, but it is grounded in 
activities that are indeed recognized by them, namely crimes. Ob­
serve also that historians concern themselves with documents and 
artifacts that are the products of action within concrete settings, 
and the routine questions of historiography begin with, Who produced 
it? In what context? For what audience? For what purpose? With what 
effects? Further, the classical anthropological and sociological 
ethnographies have been explicitly directed to describing situated 
actions and their social organizational contexts. And insofar as 
economics deals with commodities, prices, media of exchange, and the 
like, it deals with the products of situated action. In short, much 
of what is conventionally regarded as social science is concerned 
with a social world constituted by the situated actions of members 
of society, whether this be investigated from a "micro1 or a "macro" 
point of view.
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The only way to avoid defining social phenomena in terms of 
situated actions and structures of them is to treat situated actions 
themselves as epiphenomenal and hence of no real significance. One 
tradition taking this view is biological reductionism, which defines 
behavior as a physiochemical response to physical and chemical events 
in the environment of the organism, or as the working out of genetic 
inheritence independently of environmental stimuli. Another tradition 
that treats situated action as epiphenomenal is idealism, especially 
prominent in the German historical tradition of the last century and 
represented in contemporary form most notably in the structuralist 
approaches of Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, and their followers. While 
both biological reductionism and idealism have generated some contro­
versy and attracted coteries of adherents, they are open to a number 
of well-known objections and have had only marginal impact on the 
main traditions of Western social science, and we will not address 
them further.
The phenomena of interest to conventional social science, then,
are constituted by situated actions. Consider now three rather ob-2
vious features of such actions.
(1) The objectivity of social structure
Members of society tend to treat social categories, customs, 
norms, recurrent patterns of events and the like as existing 
"out there" and independently of any particular individual's 
doing. That is, social structure has an apparent objective 
character in relation to individuals and their actions and 
however it is encountered it is a fact of life to be taken 
into account or ignored at one's peril.
(2) The transparency of displays
Within a particular social group, it is in most instances 
plainly evident to the members what others are doing. Thus, 
one is generally able to see at a glance that another is 
chopping wood rather than baking bread, or is saying that 
the post office is to the left rather than straight ahead.
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Gestural and verbal displays, then, are transparent in 
the sense that members can usually apprehend directly the 
concrete, situated actions being performed.
(3) The context-dependency of meaning
The meaning of a gestural or verbal display depends on the 
context of its occurance, so that physically identical dis­
plays can have different meanings and different displays 
the same meaning, depending on the situation.
Note that these three features of situated action are essential 
properties of the social world for the member. Thus, it is a matter 
of basic competence that the objectivity of social structure, the 
transparency of displays, and the context-dependency of meaning be 
recognized and, if need be, enforced. From the point of view of the 
members, the social world is already objectively out there, trans­
parent at the level of everyday words and deeds, and determinate in 
sense if context is consulted. The person who attempts to treat social 
categories and norms as mere caprice or fantasy, who resolutely in­
sists that what others are doing is unintelligable, or who demands 
literal rather than contextually-informed interpretations is quickly 
defined as too dangerous or incompetent to be allowed normal unre­
stricted rights within the group.
In these terms, the extreme positions with respect to quantita­
tive and qualitative methods selectively emphasize different features 
of situated action and neglect others. The radical quantitative view 
focuses entirely on the experienced objectivity of social structure 
and transparency of displays while treating the context-dependency 
of meaning as merely a technical nuisance to be dealt with in speci­
fic research situations but without theoretical or methodological 
importance. This assumption is the logical underpinning of the view 
that natural science is the appropriate intellectual model for social 
science, and it paves the way for the presumption that quantitative 
methods are inherently superior to qualitative approaches. In con­
trast, the radical qualitative position emphasizes the context-depen-
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dency of meaning but neglects the objectivity of social structure 
and the transparency of displays. This not only provides grounds 
for rejecting the natural science model, but also encourages denial 
of the importance of any regularities in patterns of situated action 
and a narrow focus on the full detail and complexity of any form of 
social phenomenon.
The central problem here is an inadequate understanding on all 
sides of the nature and implications of the context-dependence of 
meaning, with the result that the importance of context is either 
dismissed as uninteresting or elevated to the status of a single 
over-riding principle. However, while this points to the source of 
difficulty, it does not get us very far toward a more adequate 
methodological position. It is one thing to acknowledge the facts 
that social structure has an apparent objective character, that 
situated displays are by-and-large transparent in meaning, and that 
meaning depends on context, and quite another to take adequate 
account of these commonplaces in our methodological reflections. For 
the latter we require in addition some empirical understanding of 
the nature of context embeddedness. Consequently, we digress in the 
next two sections to consider briefly the results of some relevant 
empirical research concerning context embeddedness of situated 
actions and its relation to social structure.
Context-Embeddedness of Meaning: Indexicality and Reflexivity
The most extensive empirical investigations of the context-em- 
beddedness of meaning have been carried out by ethnomethodologists. 
Consequently, to obtain a foundation for considering the basic 
methodological issues with which we are concerned, we consider the 
results of ethnomethodological studies of social interaction. In this 
section, we introduce several concepts important for the remainder
3
of the discussion.
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Particulars
We use the term "particular" to denote anything that can enter 
into the constitution of meaning or sense on some occasion. Thus, 
a word, a gesture, or an action is potentially a particular. Parti­
culars are collected as clues at the scene of a crime, artifacts at 
an archaelogical dig, mementos of special occasions, indications, 
signs, warnings, trends, or proofs. Particulars are used to fashion 
an account or description of activities, events, occasions, and the 
like.
Indexicality
The expression, "indexical particular" is used to indicate that 
such particulars depend on context for their identity and meaning.
As we have already suggested, the assertion that the particulars with 
which we fashion our depiction of the world around us are context- 
dependent is a common place: persons in everyday life acknowledge the 
indexical character of particulars and hence of the accounts they 
constitute. What is not commonplace is the further suggestion that 
a given context invoked to disambiguate a particular is itself in­
dexical (cf. Garfinkel, 1967:10). In order to deal with the indexi­
cality of particulars, one might consider not a particular in iso­
lation but rather a particular in conjunction with its context. The 
force of the proposal that contexts are also indexical, then, is to 
block this move: indexicality is irremediable in the sense that any 
attempt to disambiguate a particular requires invocation of a context 
of further particulars that are themselves indexical.
At this point it is crucial to recall the fact of the trans­
parency of displays: the implied ambiguity of a display of parti­
culars is in fact resolved in a routine, taken-for-granted basis by 
members of society. Members of society do not experience a giddy 
swarm of indeterminate particulars, but rather a relatively stable, 
coherent social world. Not only do we, as a practical matter, come 
to terms with the irremediably indexical character of talk and action, 
but as an equally practical matter, we hold each other accountable
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for the reasonable, timely, and largely effortless accomplishment 
of the for-all-practical-purposes mastery of indexicality, that is, 
for the accomplishment of the transparency of displays.
Reflexivity
However, matters are still more complex. Consider the following 
question: if a particular is to be given a determinant meaning in 
relation to some context of other particulars, how are those parti- 
culars-as-context selected? The very item one is attempting to dis­
ambiguate provides the key to the assembly of a context, but at the 
same time, it is that context which gives the particular its speci­
fic identity in terms of which a relevant context can be constructed. 
In short, the relation between a given particular to be disambiguated 
and any particular in its disambiguating context is reflexive, for 
the given particular is part of the context needed to disambiguate 
the particulars in the context. Thus, instead of an infinite regress 
of successively broader contexts, we find a reflexivity between the 
particulars constituting the given concrete situation at hand. In 
this sense, moreover an account, which is a particular, is reflexive 
in that it is an event in the self-same order of affairs that, in 
explaining and describing, it renders orderly, (Garfinkel, 1967:7-9).
The idea of reflexivity can be illustrated by the well known 
face/goblet illusion. Seen one way, the picture is of two faces in 
silhouette with a white space between them; seen another way, it is 
of a white goblet against a black background. The essential point is 
that, either way the picture is seen, each part of the contour 
separating the white and black areas takes on an identity only in the 
context of the other parts and the whole. Thus, for example, one 
portion of the contour is a nose only in the context of another 
portion that is a chin, and vice versa. Moreover, these can be a nose 
and chin only in the context of the face as a whole. But a face can 
be seen at all only because of the presence of a nose and chin. And
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clearly the picture and its parts are not intrinsically any of these 
things since the picture can be seen alternatively as a goblet, in 
which case the very same parts of the contours become completely 
different things. Here, then, we cannot conceive of the whole as 
assembled out of pre-existing parts, nor of the parts as determined 
by some pre-existing whole. Observe, moreover, that when the figure 
is seen as a picture of two faces, it is clearly and definitely that, 
and the fact that the picture can be seen otherwise does not disturb 
this definiteness and clarity.
The concept of reflexivity holds, then, that context and parti­
cular are mutually elaborative rather than being analytically inde­
pendent terms. This relation of reflexive mutual elaboration occurs 
in the specific determination of meaning on a given occasion, and it 
is the simultaneous seeing of particular and context in their re-
4
flexive relation that constitutes the transparency of displays.
The result of numerous empirical studies is that reflexivity 
is a universal feature of situated action. Research in diverse in­
stitutional settings has forced the conclusion that in every case 
the meanings of actions, rules, norms, and social categories depend 
on the context of the particular occasions on which they occur or 
5
are used. Thus, the context dependence of meaning is not merely an 
occasional lapse on the part of more-or-less naive members of society 
but rather an inherent feature of situated action. This conclusion, 
it must be emphasized, is an empirical one rather than merely a 
theoretical or philosophical speculation. We must, then, take it 
seriously if we want to have a realistic approach to the study of 
social phenomena.
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Context-Free, Context-Sensitive Mechanisms of Interaction
We have noted several times that, from the point of view of the 
competent member of society, it is an obvious fact that the meanings 
of gestures and talk depend on context. One result of ethnomethodo- 
logical research has been to establish this indexicality as a uni­
versal feature of social interaction, and hence to force attention 
to the reflexivity of situated actions and their contexts. However, 
we can go further than merely documenting the obvious. Research on 
the detailed structure of interaction has begun to suggest how re­
flexivity is built into social interaction in such a fashion that the 
social world appears as an objective reality that for the most part 
is transparent as to the concrete meanings of situated actions.
One concept that appears to be extremely useful in organizing 
the results of these analyses of social interaction is that of con­
text-free, context-sensitive mechanisms (Sacks, Schegloff, and 
Jefferson, 1974). The leading idea is that any particular concrete 
episode of interaction is organized in the course of its development 
by the participants employing quite general mechanisms to deal with 
interactional problems that must be solved if the interaction is to 
continue, and that to be effective these mechanisms require ex­
ploitation of sequential and social organizational contexts. That is 
to say, the mechanisms are context-free in the sense of being avail­
able for use by any participant in any interaction situation and 
context-sensitive in the sense that competent use requires implicit 
or explicit invocation of or reference to the place of the current 
action in the developing sequence of interaction and the social con­
text and identities of the other participants. It is this context- 
free, context-sensitive character of the mechanisms by which inter­
action is organized that provides for social structure being an ob­
jective feature of social interaction, not in spite of, but rather 
by virtue of reflexivity.
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Perhaps the most fundamental of these context-free, context- 
sensitive mechanisms is the process described by Sacks, Schegloff, 
and Jefferson for turn-taking in conversational interaction, that is 
interaction in which there are no prior institutional arrangements 
prescribing (1) the order in which people speak, (2) the lengths of 
their turns, or (3) the specific content of what they say (Sacks 
et al., 19 74). This mechanism can be formulated as a sequence of 
options available whenever the question of speaker change arises:
(1) the current speaker may select another party as the next 
speaker;
(2) if the current speaker does not select the next one, then 
another person may select him or herself as the next 
speaker;
(3) if no other party selects him or herself as next speaker, 
then the current speaker may continue;
(4) and finally, if the current speaker does not continue, the 
option to speak cycles back to (2) (1974:703-706).
Here a turn consists not simply of a segment of talk by one person 
bounded at each end by the speech of others, but rather of a period 
of time during which a person has the right and obligation to speak. 
Turns are constructed by the speaker out of unit-types, which in 
English may be single words, phrases, clauses, sentences and perhaps 
longer segments. On gaining a turn, the speaker has an initial right 
to produce one such unit, and the terminal boundary of a unit-type, 
such as the end of a sentence, is a possible transition relevance 
place, at which a transfer of the turn from one speaker to another 
may properly occur, and at which options (1)-(4) become available 
in the indicated sequence (Sacks et al., 19 74:702-706). It should be 
noted that speakers project the structure of their utterances in such 
a way that the listener can anticipate an up-coming transition rele­
vance place such that if turn transition occurs, it can do so with 
minimum gap or overlap (Sacks et al., 1974:702-703; Schegloff, 1980). 
Moreover, the phenomena of turn taking discussed by Sacks et al., are
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oriented to by the participants in the sense that if the mechanism 
fails on a given occasion, this creates a situation requiring repair, 
e.g. a situation of more than one party speaking at a time, that is 
noticed by participants and which somehow must be resolved (Sacks 
et al., 1974:723-724). And, it is assumed, there is available to 
the participants a set of repair mechanism for addressing the inter­
actional problems in this new situation. (See also Jefferson, 1972, 
1975; Sacks and Schegloff, 1974; Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff, Jeffer­
son and Sacks, 1977). Finally, the turn-taking mechanism is context- 
free in that it applies whenever a transition-relevance place occurs 
in a conversation and is usable by any set of participants irre­
spective of the setting, the size of the group, and the social cate­
gories that distinguish them (Sack et al., 1974:699). And the 
mechanism is context-sensitive in that what constitutes a transition- 
relevance place is a contextual matter and it is usable by partici­
pants to manage such things as changing topic (Maynard, forthcoming) 
or to weave exogenous factors such as the situated identity of the 
speaker into the course of an actual conversation as, for example, 
when a subordinate "speaks only when spoken to" or a dominant party 
interrupts (cf. Zimmerman and West, 1975; West and Zimmerman, 1978). 
The context-free, context-sensitive character of the mechanism means 
that the process by which turns are allocated and regulated is the 
same in all conversations and invariant to the particular motives, 
characteristics, and circumstances of the participants. Yet how that 
mechanism is used by participants depends on the particular setting, 
the situated identities of those present, and their purposes at hand.
Turn-taking is one of a family of interrelated mechanisms for 
social interaction that includes, for example the following: adjacency 
pair structures such as question-answer, request-response, and in­
sertion sequences (Schegloff, 1972); the organization of story telling 
(Jefferson, 1979; cf. also Sacks, 1974); negotiation sequences 
(Jefferson and Schenkein, 1977; Schenkein, 1979; Maynard, 1979); 
agreement-disagreement sequences (Pomeranz, 1975); the opening and 
closing of conversation (Schegloff, 1968; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973);
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locational formulations (Schegloff, 1972); and repair systems 
(Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks, 1977; Jefferson, 1975). In each 
case, we have a context-free, context-sensitive mechanism through 
which the participants construct their actual conversation turn by 
turn. Social interaction, then, is constructed within actual 
situations by actual participants. It is managed over the course of 
particular turns at talk, and the conversational events thus con­
stituted are securely lodged in a sequential and social organizatio­
nal context, displaying transparency of meaning except in anomolous 
instances needing corrective work.
The Reproduction of Social Structure
Social interaction takes place through mechanisms which are 
context-free in that they are available in any setting or situation 
but are context-sensitive in that their appropriate use at any par­
ticular point depends on the sequential and social context. However, 
there appear to be the makings of a paradox here, since social 
structural categories are, on the evidence, as context-dependent for 
their meanings as any other features of social interaction. Let us 
turn, then, to a more detailed look at the way social structure is 
related to situated action.
For this purpose, we make use of the notion of social category 
as it has been refined in Sacks1 discussion of membership categori­
zation (1972a, 1972b). A membership categorization device contains 
a collection of categories that may be applied to the members of a 
given population. For example, a prominent device in contemporary 
society is "occupation", where the categories applied to various 
members include "mechanic", "student", and so on. A related idea is 
what Sacks terms a "category bound activity", which is a specific 
activity umputedly done by members of given categories. Thus, atten­
ding classes is an activity bound to the category "student", as is 
being late to classes, while making investment decisions is an activi- 
ty bound to the category "banker", as is embezzlement. The key point
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now is that membership categorization devices and the categories 
and category-bound activities they contain are the means by which 
members make use of institutional structure in the course of their 
interaction to make what they are doing intelligible, and at the 
same time it is through such use that social structure is reproduced 
as a real thing in the social world of the members. Thus, as Giddens 
(1977:118) has pointed out, social structure is simultaneously a
7
resource for and a product of social interaction.
Let us consider an example, analyzed for somewhat different 
purposes in Maynard and Wilson (1980, pp. 299).
1. George: 'R you takin' Sosh or what. Or
2. Laura: Yea:ah. (.) Sosh two
For George's question to be meaningful, he must take it for granted 
that Laura is a student at X University (where the conversation was 
recoded), and that taking sociology courses ("Sosh1') is one of the 
things such students do, that is, it is an activity bound to the 
category "Student at X University". Note, further, that for Laura's 
response to be heard as an answer to George, she also must take it 
for granted that she is a student at X University and that taking 
sociology is an appropriate category bound activity. Here, plainly, 
George and Laura are employing elements of what, from a sociological 
point of view, we would call the institutional structure of the 
university to render their interaction intelligible and coherent. 
Observe also that from a technical conversation analysis point of 
view, this exchange is a simple question-answer sequence, and the 
context-sensitivity of such a structure consists precisely in the 
fact that what can be heard as a sensible question and what can be 
heard as an answer depend on the context.
So far, the argument is a fairly standard conversation-analytic 
one. The additional sociological point to be made now is that in em­
ploying these categories in this way, Laura and George in fact are 
reproducing the institutional structure of the university. For, in
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using the categories and category-bound activities in this fashion 
to render their interaction coherent and meaningful, and at the same 
time treating each other's talk as warranted grounds for further in­
ference and action, the speakers are presenting the universityg
structure as a real object. However, it must also be emphasized that 
social structural categories employed in this way in social inter­
action are no more exempt from the context-embeddedness of meaning 
than are any other particulars. Thus, what a student is and does are 
not matters that can be determined independently of particular inter­
action situations. Hence the social structure that is reproduced in 
social interactions is constituted through those interactions.
As another example, consider the following interaction in a 
courtroom. The participants are a judge, a public defender (P.D.), 
and a district attorney (D.A.) regarding a defendant who had earlier 
pled guilty to a charge of second degree burglary. The defendant 
was also present but did not speak. The question before the court is 
that of sentencing.
1. P.D.: Your Honor, we request immediate sentencing and
2. waive the probation report.
3. Judge: What's his record:
4. P.D.: He has a prior drunk and a GTA (Grand Theft Auto).
5. Nothing serious. This is just a shoplifting case.
6. He did enter the K-Mart with the intent to steal.
7. But really all we have here is a petty theft.
8. Judge: What do the people have?
9. D.A.: Nothing either way.
10. Judge: Any objections to immediate sentencing?
11. D.A.: No.
12. Judge: How long has he been in?
13. P.D.: Eighty-three days.
14. Judge: I make this a misdemeanor by P.C. article 17 and
15. sentence you to ninety days in County Jail, with
16. credit for time served.
This transcript is analyzed in some detail in Maynard and Wilson 
(1980), but for our purposes it is sufficient to draw attention to 
two major points. First, observe that at each turn the talk is under­
standable only by invoking the criminal justice system as an insti­
tutional context, and in employing the categories of the criminal
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system in this way, the participants are reproducing that structure. 
Second, note that this exchange departs from a conversation in that 
the judge here has preemptory rights to interrupt, ask questions, 
and in general direct the course of interaction. However, these 
features are notable precisely because of their departure from the 
turn-taking model for conversation, and they are intelligable only 
by invoking the institutionalized role of the judge. Thus once again 
we see the reflexive relation between interaction and social struc­
ture, for in using the category "judge" to render the interaction 
coherent, the role and its institutional framework are reproduced.
To summarize, the social world is constituted through situated 
actions produced in particular concrete situations and which are 
available to the participants for their own recognition, description, 
and use as warranted grounds for further inference and action on 
those same occasions as well as subsequent ones. Situated actions 
are produced through context-free, context-sensitive mechanisms of 
social interaction, and social structure is used by members of socie­
ty to render their actions in particular situations intelligible 
and coherent. In this process, social structure is both an essential 
resource for and a product of situated action, and social structure 
is reproduced as an objective reality that partially constrains 
action. It is through this reflexive relation between social struc­
ture and situated action that the transparency of displays is accom­
plished by exploiting the context-dependence of meaning.
Methodological Implications
Let us return now to our main concern, the question of the re­
lation between quantitative and qualitative methods and the issues 
with which this has become surrounded. It is evident that on empirical 
grounds the context-embeddedness of meaning cannot be disregarded as 
a technical nuisance, nor can it be used to justify denial of the 
importance of regularities in patterns of situated action. The metho­
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dological situation of the social sciences, then, is quite different 
from what has been assumed in most current discussions, and it is 
this that leads to the gap between formal methodological canons and 
much actual research practice. To move toward a more realistic 
approach, we must in fact abandon four central assumptions under­
lying most formal discussions of social science methodology: the 
utility of the nomothetic-ideographic distinction, the notion that 
the basic methodological problems of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches differ in kind, the assumption that quantitative and 
qualitative approaches are genuine alternatives, and the idea that 
objectivity is a property of knowledge that derives from adherence 
to specified rules of procedure.
Untenability of the Nomethetic-Ideographic Distinction
The distinction conventionally drawn between seeking to explain 
social phenomena in terms of transhistorical universal laws on the 
model of the natural sciences and attempting to understand them in 
all their concrete individuality and complexity is fundamentally mis­
leading. This dichotomy informs virtually all methodological dis­
cussions in the social sciences, but it profoundly misrepresents 
the nature of social reality by supposing that one can have either 
genuine nomothetic explanation of social phenomena or purely ideo­
graphic understanding when in fact neither is possible.
On the one hand, nomothetic explanation consists of showing 
that the facts to be explained can be deduced logically from a con­
junction of universal laws and further facts about the particular 
situation that are taken to be given for the purpose of the explana­
tion. For this kind of explanation to make sense, the terms appearing 
in the laws and descriptions of phenomena must have the same meaning 
no matter where or when they are applied, since otherwise one cannot 
claim to have used the same law to explain facts in different situa­
tions. However, we have seen that situated actions are reflexively 
tied to the social structural contexts within which they occur, and
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these contexts vary across cultural traditions and over historical 
periods. Consequently, the only possibility for genuine nomothetic 
explanation of social phenomena is to describe them in terms that 
are entirely independent of the meanings of situated actions, which 
would require abandoning most of the topics of interest to social 
science. Thus, the search for non-trivial, non-metaphorical trans- 
historical laws of social phenomena will be as barren in the future
9
as it has in the past.
On the other hand, the idea that one can ignore regularities in 
patterns of situated action is equally misleading. For, we have also 
seen that social structural categories reflecting trans-situational 
regularities enter into the constitution of the meanings of situated 
actions, so that one cannot make sense of what is going here and now 
without reference to regularities in the social environment. Thus, 
understanding social phenomena cannot be limited to grasping com­
plexes of meanings, even as the question of meaning cannot be dis­
missed as 1 metaphysical" or "subjective".
All this does not, of course, imply that general concepts are 
irrelevant to the social sciences, but only that their status is 
different from that of general concepts in the natural sciences. In 
the natural sciences, general concepts represent classes in the strict 
logical sense, whereas in the social sciences they are ideal types 
in Weber’s sense (see Burger, 1976). Further, comparative studies 
across cultural and historical contexts remain fully intelligible, 
but their purpose cannot be reasonably construed as seeking univer­
sal generalizations but rather as locating and illuminating simi­
larities and differences between the particular cultures or historical 
periods that are examined. Here, Weber's work still stands as a model.
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The Homogeneity of Methods
It is evident that trans-situational regularities within a 
particular institutional context abound, and that understanding 
them is essential for understanding how a particular social system 
works. It is obvious, further, that quantitative methods, often 
highly sophisticated, are needed to unravel such phenomena. How­
ever, it is also apparent that identifying the component events 
making up such regularities depends irremediably on a qualitative 
understanding of the situated actions through which the regularities 
are produced. At the very minimum, the operations of recognizing 
and classifying events depend on such qualitative understandings, 
and all subsequent manipulation and interpretation of the data is 
intelligible only in light of those understandings.
From these observations it follows that no clear distinction 
can be drawn between the basic methodological problems of quantita­
tive and qualitative approaches. For, if we leave aside purely tech­
nical matters such as sampling procedures and methods of statistical 
estimation and inference, we see that the gathering and interpretation 
of quantitative data is methodologically indistinguishable from the 
gathering and interpretation of qualitative data. Indeed, what we 
call "quantitative" data turns out on inspection to be merely repeated 
qualitative observations by someone, whether the researcher and his 
or her assistants, government bureaucrats, or ordinary members of 
society. Thus, all the problems of "bias", "selectivity", "subjecti­
vity", and the like that can be raised about a field worker's ethno­
graphic report have counterparts in the form of interviewer effects, 
questionnaire design, selection and formulation of specific items, 
and so on, that are well known to those who must deal with the prac­
tical problems of gathering data, cleaning it, and organizing it so 
that it can be read into the computer, though these problems are 
apparently easily forgotten by those who get their data already on 
a computer tape ready to analyze. Moreover, it is useless to pretend 
that these difficulties will "average out" with a large sample, for
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the problem is not one of random error. There are of course practical 
steps one can take to attempt to deal with these problems, and these 
remedies are part of the lore of competent research. The crucial 
point, however, is that these steps are not applications of further 
quantitative techniques but rather depend essentially on qualitative 
understanding of the particular research situation.
The Interdependence of Methods
It follows further that qualitative and quantitative approaches 
are complementary rather than competitive methods. Each supplies a 
kind of information that is not only different from the other but 
also essential for interpreting the other. Quantitative data reveal 
patterns of regularities in situated actions and give essentially 
distributive information, while qualitative data shed light on the 
concrete social processes by which particular patterns of situated 
actions are produced. Consequently, use of a particular method can­
not be justified in terms of one's "paradigm" or preference but rather
i o
must be based on the nature of the actual research problem at hand. 
Moreover, in order to avoid major confusion of mere correlation for 
causal connection and gross specification error in formulating sta­
tistical models, it is necessary to know something about the processes 
by which the regularities are produced that one is studying with quan­
titative methods. In short, interpretation of quantitative data is 
informed by the analyst's qualitative understanding of the specific 
social phenomena under study, just as interpretation of qualitative 
data is informed by the investigator's knowledge of regular patterns 
of which the particular events he or she is examining are parts. One 
can, of course, loose sight of the way interpretations of quantitative 
data depend on qualitative understanding, and vice versa, and present 
one's findings as though they were arrived at by uncontaminated use 
of a single approach, but this kind of self deception is neither 
helpful nor necessary.
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Obj ectivity
Finally, we observe that the question of objectivity in social 
research is not an abstract epistemological one that can be dealt 
with by mechanically following certain rules of procedure. The idea 
that objectivity results from adhering to a certain "methodology" 
derives from confusing philosophy of science with the practice of 
science: while philosophers may concern themselves with such questions 
as how we can have objective knowledge and how we can know when we 
have it, the problems facing empirical researchers are quite diffe­
rent .
Specifically, the question researchers must address whenever 
they encounter a report of someone else's work that is relevant to 
their own is whether they can take that work seriously as warranted 
grounds for further inference and action in their own research. Con­
versely, in their own research, the question is whether they can 
expect others to take their work seriously in the same way. The point 
here is not simply one of whether a particular research report is 
persuasive, nor is it that agreement among colleagues defines what is 
"fact". Forr acceptance of one's work by others is not a symbolic 
matter but a practical one that obligates others to take account of 
it insofar as it is relevant to their research under the threat that 
their research in turn will not be taken seriously if they ignore it. 
Thus, if a particular piece of work happens to contain flaws unknown 
at the time and is accepted as adequate, then sooner or later dis­
crepancies will begin to appear as other researchers cover similar 
ground, bring more powerful methods to bear, discover new data, 
attempt replication, and follow up implications of the original work. 
The situation is complicated, moreover, by the fact that few studies 
are perfect, and consequently, as Max Weber noted, it is the fate 
of almost any piece of work on an important topic to be superceded 
or at least significantly qualified by subsequent research. The fun­
damental point is that objective knowledge does not consist of pro­
positions with certified truth claims but rather is that which a 
given scientific or scholarly community holds its members responsible 
for taking seriously as bases for their own work.
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The problem, then, is not how to guarantee taking someone 
else's work seriously if and only if it is correct, or how to pro­
duce work that one can guarantee to others is correct. Rather, it 
is a question of when researchers will view acceptance of a piece 
of work as reasonable and failure to do so as irresponsible. Clearly, 
this is a matter of judgements made on a daily basis by individuals 
working in a particular field and cannot be reduced to a set of 
rules.
If we reflect on how researchers in fact procede rather than 
appeal to textbook idealizations of "scientific method", we find at 
least two major considerations entering into the assessment of a 
piece of work. The first is what we may call internal coherence.
The question here is whether the data of the study and the methods 
by which they were gathered are consistent with the interpretation 
given to them. The issues connected with internal coherence turn out 
to be largely technical: is the sample appropriate, was the observer 
in a position to see what was reported, was the arithmetic done 
correctly in computing the statistical tests, did the researcher 
understand what was going on so that his or her observations are 
trustworthy, are logical inferences carried out validly, are there 
no crucial conceptual ambiguities, and so on. These are matters that 
standard textbooks on methods tend to deal with, and there is much 
valuable lore concerning them. However, there is another element, 
what we will call external coherence: do the findings cohere with 
what else we know about the phenomenon under investigation from other 
sources? For example, we might have a very tidy survey analysis that 
is quite coherent internally but which implies a causal structure 
flatly contradicted by the historical development of the situation 
and direct observation. Or we might have an elegant historical argu­
ment that simply can't be right because it implies a present state of 
affairs that isn't so. While these considerations in fact play a 
prominent role in our judgments concerning the soundness of one 
another's work, they have no sanctioned place within the standard 
methodological canons, with the partial exception of the emphasis
- 61 -
placed on problems of specification error in structural equation 
modeling. Instead, conventional methodological discussion confine 
themselves largely to problems of internal coherence on the mistaken 
assumption that correct method alone will guarantee sound results.
Internal coherence, then, has to do with whether the interpre­
tation put forward makes sense in light of the data and methods 
actually presented in the study. We are taught early the importance 
of there being no blatant contradictions in the stories we tell, 
and so we tend to be fairly adept at satisfying the requirement of 
internal coherence. The requirement of external coherence, in con­
trast, opens our research up to critique in light of data not our 
own nor even gathered in our own intellectual tradition. The point, 
of course, is not that our interpretations have to agree with those 
of others, but rather that they can accomodate the empirical mate­
rials on which other interpretations are based without having to 
selectively suppress particular items or do too much ad hoc ex­
plaining away of awkward facts. Because of the near-exclusive focus 
methodological discussions have given to problems of internal co­
herence, the issues surrounding external coherence are often only 
vaguely appreciated and sometimes neglected entirely.
In summary, what we as researchers are willing to call objective 
work is that which satisfies the requirements of internal and exter­
nal coherence insofar as we can tell at the time the work was done. 
Moreover, these assessments are not all-or-nothing matters: we may 
have confidence in some aspects of a study but not in others, and 
consequently we will take those parts more seriously than others.
In the end, what we take as objective is that which we treat as 
adequate grounds for further thought and action under the constraint 
that, in the long run, our colleagues are looking over our shoulders.
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Conclusion
It seems somewhat peculiar to be arguing at length for what 
may appear obvious to many social scientists: there are no privi­
leged methods; quantitative and qualitative methods each have their 
appropriate uses ; and in the end one cannot do without relying on 
both kinds of data. The occasion for this essay, then, is the fact 
that this common-sense view is strongly denied by the major metho­
dological positions in contemporary social science. There is, then, 
a gap between formal methodological rhetoric and actual research 
practice. The fundamental assumption of this paper is that what is 
in need of correction is our formal methodological discourse. The 
approach we took was to consider in some detail the nature of social 
phenomena constituted by situated actions, relying heavily on empi­
rical ethnomethodological studies of social interaction. This led to 
the view that situated action is reflexively related to its social 
organizational context, which must be taken into account in any 
methodological reflections. Finally, we drew several methodological 
conclusions that run directly counter to much of the received tra­
dition in the social science methodological practice. We are, then, 
in a position to abandon formulations that are unrealistic and ir­
relevant to actual research and move toward a methodological view 
that reflects the nature of our subject matter.
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NOTES
4*
Revision of remarks to the ZUMA Workshop, July 1981. I am indebted 
to Don H. Zimmerman and Manfred Küchler for useful comments, and 
to the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Federal Republic 
of Germany, for generous support.
1. For extreme expressions of the quantitative and qualitative 
positions, respectively, see Gold (1979) and Blumer (1969). It 
should be noted that qualitative approaches divide into two major 
categories, historical research and direct observation of social 
interaction. For a discussion of the latter that is congruent with 
the ideas developed here, see Zimmerman (1981).
2. Portions of this section and the one following are adapted 
with permission from Wilson and Zimmerman (1980:54-55, 57-60, 67-71).
3. For a more extended discussion and references, see Wilson 
and Zimmerman (1980).
4. This formulation raises two important questions: an appear­
ance of circularity and the status of natural science. We cannot 
take the space to discuss these issues here but instead refer to 
Wilson and Zimmerman (1980:60-63) and Maynard and Wilson (1980: 
passim).
5. Bittner (1967a; 1967b); Cicourel (1968;1973); Cicourel, 
Jennings, Jennings, Leiter, MacKay, Mehan and Roth (1974); Daudistel 
(1976); Emerson and Pollner (1976); Garfinkel (1967); J. Handel 
(1972); W. Handel (1972); Hilbert (1978); Jefferson (1972; 1973; 1975; 
1979); Jefferson and Schenkein (1977); Leiter (1971); Maynard
(1979, forthcoming); Mehan (1971); Pomeranz (1975; 1978); Pollner 
(1974; 1975, in press); Sacks (1967; 1972a; 1972b; 1973; 1974; 1975); 
Sacks and Schegloff (1974); Sacks et al. (1974); Sanders (1977); 
Schegloff (1968; 1972); Schegloff and Sacks (1973); Schenkein (1979); 
Sudnow (1965; 1969; 1972); Wieder (1974); Williams (1977); Zimmerman 
(1969; 1970a; 1970b).
- 64 -
6. Note that social category and category-bound activity are 
not the same as the Lintonian concepts of status and role, but 
rather are more general, including disapproved behavior customarily 
seen as associated with the category as well as behavior that is 
approved.
7. However, Giddens does not attend to the context-free, context' 
sensitive character of the mechanisms by which social interaction is 
organized, and consequently his (1979) discussion follows a direction 
different from that taken here.
8. "Objectified" in a Marxian sense, though not necessarily
1 alienated" or "reified". See Maynard and Wilson (1980) for further 
discussion.
9. From time to time the claim is advanced that situated action 
can be described in a context-free manner, but without exception the 
claim has had to be abandoned. One example is behaviorist psychology, 
which has made large claims concerning the context-free description 
of behavior, but these are slowly disappearing (e.g., Bandura, 1973). 
Most recently the claim appears in the artificial intelligence 
literature (see Wilson and Zimmerman, 1980: 60-61 and note 9), an 
especially prominent example being Hofstadter (1979) , who, however, 
is able to seem to make his case only by stretching the usually 
sharply defined concepts of isomorphism and chunking into metaphors 
so as to conceal the reflexivity of meaning.
It should be noted that the context-free, context-sensitive 
mechanisms by which interaction is organized are not laws of social 
phenomena in the sense intended here, for these mechanisms do not 
deal with the content of situated actions. See Wilson and Zimmerman 
(1980) and Maynard and Wilson (1980) for further discussion.
10. Note that the so-called "interpretive paradigm" does not 
preclude the use of quantitative methods. See Wilson (1970:706 note 
15) .
- 65 -
REFERENCES
Bandura, Albert (1973) Aggression: A Social Analysis. Prentice Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs.
Bittner, Egon (1967a) "The Police on Skid Row". American Sociological 
Review 32:699-715.
Bittner, Egon (1967b) "Police Apprehension of Mentally 111 Persons". 
Social Problems 14:278-292.
Burger, Thomas (1976) Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation.
Duke University Press: Durham.
Blumer, Herbert (1969) Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and 
Methods. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.
Blumer, Herbert (1968) The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. 
Wiley: New York.
Blumer, Herbert (1973) Theory and Method in a Study of Argentine 
Fertility. Wiley: New York.
Cicourel, A.V. (1968) The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. 
Wiley: New York.
Cicourel, A.V. (1973) Cognitive Sociology. Penguin: Middlesex.
Cicourel, A.V., K.H. Jennings, S.H.M. Jennings, K.C.W. Leiter,
Robert MacKay, Hugh Mehan, and D.R. Roth (1974) Language Use and 
Performance. Academic Press: New York.
Daudistel, Howard (1976) "Deciding What the Law Means: An Examination 
of Police-Prosecutor Discretion". Diss. University of California: 
Santa Barbara.
Emerson, R.M., and M. Pollner (1976) "Dirty Work Designations: Their 
Features and Consequences a Psychiatric Setting". Social Problems 
23:243-254.
Garfinkel, Harold (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall: 
Englewood Cliffs.
Giddens, Anthony (1977) Studies in Social and Political Theory.
Basic Books: New York.
Giddens, Anthony (1979) Central Problems in Social Theory. University 
of California Press: Berkeley.
Gold, David (1979) "Social Research and Social Problems: Toward a 
Structural Explanation of a Fuzzy Association". Pacific Socio- 
logical Review 22:275-283
Handel, Judith (1972) "Learning to Categorize1'. Diss. University of 
California: Santa Barbara.
- 66 -
Handel, Warren (1972) "Perception as a Constructive Process".
Diss. University of California: Santa Barbara.
Hayek, F.A. (1952) The Conter-Revolution of Science. Free Press: 
Glencoe.
Hilbert, Richard A. (1978) "Learning How To Teach: A Study in Role 
Acquisition". Diss. University of California: Santa Barbara.
Jefferson, G. (1972) "Side Sequences". Pp. 194-338 in D. Sudnow (ed.) 
Studies in Social Interaction. Free Press: New York.
Jefferson, G. (1973) "A Case of Precision Timing in Ordinary Con­
versation: Overlapped Tag-Positions Address Terms in Closing 
Sequences". Semiotica 9:47-96.
Jefferson, G. (1975) "Error Correction as an Interactional Resource". 
Language in Society 3: 181-19 9.
Jefferson, G. (1978) "Sequential Aspects of Storytelling in Conver­
sation".Pp. 219-248 in J. Schenkein (ed.) Studies in the Organi­
zation of Conversational Interaction. Academic Press: New York.
Jefferson, G., and J. Schenkein (1977) "Some Sequential Negotiations 
in Conversation: Unexpanded and Expanded Versions of Projected 
Action Sequences." Sociology 11:87-103
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1979) Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden 
Braid. Basic Books: New York.
Leiter, Kenneth (1971) "Telling It Like It Is: A Study of Teachers." 
Diss. University of California: Santa Barbara.
Maynard, Douglas (1979) "People Processing: Plea-Bargaining in a 
Municipal Court." Diss. University of California: Santa Barbara.
Maynard, Douglas (forthcoming) "Placement of Topic Changes in Con­
versation." Semiotica.
Maynard, Douglas W., and Thomas P. Wilson (1980) "On the Reification 
of Social Structure." Pp. 287-322 in Scott G. McNall and Gary 
N. Howe (eds.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Vol 1.
JAI Press: Greenwich, Conn.
Mehan, Hugh (1971) "Accomplishing Understanding in Educational 
Settings." Diss. University of California: Santa Barbara.
Mills, C. Wright (1940) "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motives." 
American Sociological Review 5:904-913
Pomeranz, Anita (1975) "A Study of Some Features of Agreement/Dis­
agreements." Diss. University of California: Irvine.
- 67 -
Pomeranz, Anita ( 1978) "Compliment Responses: Notes on the Cooperation, 
of Multiple Constraints." Pp. 79-112 in J. Schenkein (ed.)
Studies in the Organization of Conversational Interaction.
Academic Press: New York.
Pollner, M. (1974) "Mundane Reasoning." Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 4:35-54.
Pollner, M. (1975) "The Very Coinage of Your Brain: The Anatomy of 
Reality Disjunction." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 5:411-4 30.
Pollner, M. <1979) "Explicative Transactions: Making and Mana­
ging Meanings in Traffic Court." In George Psathas (ed.) Everyday 
Language: Studies in Ethnomethodology. Irvington Press: New York.
Sacks, Harvey (1967) "The Search for Help: No One To Turn To." In
E. Schneidman (ed.) Essays in Self-Destruction. Science House:
New York.
Sacks, Harvey (1972a) "On the Analyzability of Stories by Children."
Pp. 235-345 in J. Gumperz and D. Hymes (eds.) Directions in Socio- 
linguistics. Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York.
Sacks, Harvey (1972b) "An Initial Investigation of the Usability of 
Conversational Data for Doing Sociology." In David Sudnow (ed.) 
Studies in Social Interaction. Free Press: New York
Sacks, Harvey (1973) "On Some Puns With Some Intimations." In Roger 
Shuy (ed.) Linguistics and Language Science, Monograph - 25. 
Georgetown University Press: Washington, D.C.
Sacks, Harvey (1974) "An Analysis of a Joke's Telling in Conversation." 
Pp. 337-353 in Richard Bauman and Joel Sherzer (eds.) Exploration 
in the Ethnography of Speaking. Cambridge University Press: New 
York.
Sacks, Harvey (1975) "Everybody Was To Lie." Pp. 57-80 in Mary Sanchez 
and Ben Blount (eds.) Sociocultural Dimensions of Language Use. 
Academic Press: New York.
Sacks, Harvey, and Emanuel Schegloff (1974) "Two Preferences in the 
Organization of Reference to Persons in Conversation and Then 
Interaction." In N.H. Avison and R.J. Wilson (eds.) Ethnomethodol- 
ogy, Labelling Theory and Deviant Behavior. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul: London.
Sacks, Harvey, E. Schegloff, and G. Jefferson (1974) "A Simplest
Systematices for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation." 
Language 5:696-735.
Sanders, William B. (1977) Detective Work: A Study of Criminal In­
vestigations . Free Press: New York.
- 68 -
Schegloff, Emanuel (1968) "Sequencing in Conversational Openings." 
American Anthropologist 70:1075-1095.
Schegloff, Emanuel (1972) "Notes on a Conversational Practice:
Formulating Place." Pp. 7 5-119 in David Sudnow (ed.) Studies in 
Social Interaction. Free Press, New York.
Schegloff, Emanuel (1980) "Preliminaries to Preliminaries: 'Can I 
Ask You a Question?'" Sociological Inquiry 50: 104-152.
Schegloff, Emanuel, Gail Jefferson, and Harvey Sacks (1977) "The 
Preference for Self-Correction in the Organization of Repair in 
Conversations." Language 53:361-382.
Schegloff, Emanuel, and Harvey Sacks (1973) "Opening Up Closings." 
Semiotica 8:289-327.
Schenkein, Jim ( 1979 "Identity Negotiations in Conversation."
Pp. 57-78 in James Schenkein (ed.) Studies in the Organization 
of Conversational Interaction. Academic Press: New York.
Sudnow, David (1965) "Normal Crimes." Social Problems 12:255-276.
Sudnow, David (1969) Passing on. Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.
Sudnow, David (1972) "Temporal Parameters of Interpersonal Observa­
tions." Pp. 259-279 in David Sudnow (ed.) Studies in Social Inter­
action. Free Press: New York.
Wieder, D.L. (1974) Language and Social Reality: The Case of Telling 
the Convict Code. Mouton: The Hague.
West, Candace (1978) "Communicating Gender: A Study of Dominance and 
Control in Conversation." Diss. University of California: Santa 
Barbara.
Williams, Michael (1977) "Playing It By Ear: The Functions of Typified 
Knowledge in Police Patrol." Diss. University of California:
Santa Barbara.
Wilson, Thomas P. (1970) "Conceptions of Interaction and Forms of 
Sociological Explanation." American Sociological Review 35:697- 
710.
Wilson, Thomas P., and Don H. Zimmerman (1980) "Ethnomethodology,
Sociology, and Theory." Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 7:52-
Zimmerman, D.H. (1969) "Tasks and troubles: The Practical Bases of 
Work Activities in a Public Assistance Organization." Pp. 237-266 
in Donald A. Hanson (ed.) Explorations in Sociology and Counseling. 
Houghton-Mifflin: Boston.
- 69 -
Zimmerman, D.H. (1970a) "Record Keeping and the Intake Process in 
a Public Welfare Agency." Pp. 311-354 in Stanton Wheeler (ed.)
On Record. Basic Books: New York.
Zimmerman, D.H. (1970b) "The Practicalities of Rule Use." Pp. 221- 
238 in J. Douglas (ed.) Understanding Everyday Life. Aldine: 
Chicago.
Zimmerman, D.H. (1981) "Field Work as a Qualitative Method." (In 
diesem Band).
Zimmerman, D.H.,and Candace West (1975) "Sex Roles, Interruptions, 
and Silence." Pp. 105-129 in B. Thome and N. Henley (eds.) 
Language and Sex: Difference and Dominance. Newbury House: Rowley.
- 70 -
Teilnehmerliste
1. Manfred Auwärter MPI, Starnberg
2 . Hanns-Georg Brose Universität Marburg
3. Michael Buttgereit GHS Kassel
4. Jörn Diekmann Universität Dortmund
5. Inge Dieterich Universität Bremen
6. Manfred Gehrmann FU Berlin
7. Bernd Haupert TH Darmstadt
8. Ingeborg Helling Universität Bielefeld
9. Harry Hermanns GHS Kassel
10. Christel Hopf MPI, Berlin
11. Charles Kaplan Universität Frankfurt
12. Edit Kirsch MPI, Starnberg
13. Klaus Klenovits Universität Bochum
14. Thomas Kohlmann Universität Marburg
15. Helmut Krauch GHS Kassel
.16. Heidi Krüger RWTH Aachen
17. Udo Kuckartz FU Berlin
18. Sabine Kudera Universität München
19. Werner Langenheder Gesellschaft für Mathematik 
St. Augustin
•o04 Manfred Langehennig TU Berlin
21 . Ulrike Martiny Universität Hamburg
22. Hartmut Neuendorff Universität Dortmund
23. Werner Nothdurft Institut f. Deutsche Sprache 
Mannheim
24. Gerd Paul Universität Frankfurt
25. Marita Rosch Universität Mannheim
26. Peter Schmidt ZUMA, Mannheim
27. Friedrich Schrecker Wiesbaden
to CD • Anne Sprenger FU Berlin
29. Elmar Weingarten FU Berlin
